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ARTICLES
Is the President Bound by the Supreme
Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs
and National Security
Reexamined
By JORDAN J. PAUST*

Introduction
This article is concerned with whether or not the President and
other members of the executive branch are bound by the United States
Constitution and other laws comprising the supreme law of the land'
when "foreign affairs" or "national security" interests are involved.
This general issue also involves more specific concerns about governmental attempts to control both access to and content of public information. For example, if the President could act without regard to the
supreme law of the land, then, functionally at least, his control of ac-

cess to and the content of information in a courtroom, a newspaper
office, a television or radio station, a publishing house, a library, a
classroom, or even the governmental "foggy-bottom" could be furthered by numerous strategies.' New and dangerous meanings of "na* Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.M., 1972, University of Virginia; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University. I am indebted to Margaret Harris, J.D., 1981, University of Houston, for her help in
researching some of the cases noted in Part III of this article.
1. Under article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, the supreme law of the
land includes "It]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. These strategies might include arresting and holding incommunicado all political
dissenters and social nonconformists, closing newspapers or other forms of communication,
punishing those who disclose unfavorable information, misusing classified governmental information, or imposing martial law. What would have happened, in fact, if President
Nixon, through White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman or General Alexander Haig,
had asked high-level Pentagon officials to cooperate with a declaration of martial law to
control dissent and allow his continuation in power? One hopes the Pentagon officials
would have refused.
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tional security," "executive privilege," or "political question" might be
conditioned by an unrestrained executive power. Indeed, if the precept

that all are bound to comply with the law is not recognized as the preemptory norm conditioning the meaning of each of these phrases, then
it is likely that the legal niceties and the nuances of judicial choice concerning public access to information will be trampled by an advancing,

all-powerful executive immunity. In such a circumstance, it would be
possible for many of the writers and readers of this law review to be
jailed or assassinated if the Executive thought that the printed word
was, as it is often considered abroad, threatening to the retention of
power. In the end, if amorphous phrases such as "national security"

are used to justify various anticonstitutional and antidemocratic evils,
then important freedoms of speech and press, including the public's
right of access to and dissemination of information, will become
3
meaningless.
In another article,4 1 sought to document related dangers posed to

the human and constitutional rights of Americans by similar trends occurring in our society and, more alarmingly, in numerous other socie-

ties throughout the world. In that article, disturbing aspects of dicta in
some United States cases and the unacceptable claims of Richard
Nixon were discussed: (1) that "the President is like a 'sovereign' and
can ignore constitutional prohibitions and federal law in order to protect national 'security,' "5 and (2) that, when applying or interpreting
law, so-called "governmental interests" can outweigh public interests
3. In a provocative article, Professor Arthur Miller has suggested that we have nearly
arrived at such a level of governmental dictatorship with a far too frequent acceptance of a
"doctrine" of raison d'itat and a functional "Constitution of Control." Miller, Reason of
State andthe Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REv. 585, 585 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Miller, Reason ofState]. Elsewhere, he has warned that "crisis government" will
soon be normal as "increasingly despotic governments" develop globally and the United
States becomes more authoritarian in order to protect "interests of the state." Miller, ConstitutionalLaw: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736, 737, 739-41, 74950 (1978). He also quotes Senators Church and Mathias for the proposition that, in the
United States, "emergency government has become the norm." Id. at 737. See also A.
MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL 200,205-14,225-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as A. MILLER]. For evidence of global trends of emergency decrees often instituted in the
name of "national security" and "interests of the state," see Paust, InternationalLaw and
Controlofthe Medi" Terror, Repressionand the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Paust, InternationalLaw],and note 7 infra. For evidence of domestic trends
involving government agency attempts to suppress political dissent, see F. DONNER, THE
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

SYSTEM (1980).

4. Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 622. See also A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 225-27; Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege,the Congressand the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1974) (presidential brief
in United States v. Nixon arguing that Nixon was not subject to criminal law); note 110 infra.
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and obviate democratic freedoms.6 What I did not predict, despite an

awareness of the deprivations of human and constitutional rights suffered increasingly by most of our global neighbors,7 is that certain government attorneys, not long after the resignation of Richard Nixon,
would vigorously reassert these and related claims with apparent
sincerity. More importantly, I did not realize how easily certain federal
judges would accept quite similar, if partially hidden, claims when
"foreign affairs" or foreign persons were somehow involved. So quick-

ly and so easily have democratic values and human rights been seriously threatened.

A recent four-four split among the members of the United States
Supreme Court in Kissinger v. Haperin,8 although generally reaffirming our constitutional values, creates additional concern as to whether

or not a few justices might be dangerously close to considering a Nixonian view of both the presidency and the role of the judiciary in a
democratic process.9 In the following pages, an effort is made to iden6. Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 655. In the past, there had been case
language supportive of President Nixon's second claim. See, e.g., cases cited in Miller, Reason of State, supra note 3, at 607; Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 664 n.282.
7. See generally Paust, International Law, supra note 3, at 621-22, 632-33. These
trends abroad continue, quite often at an increased rate. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1981, at
AI, cols. 5 & 6 (Poland's martial law crackdown); N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1981, at A3, col. 5
(Egyptian arrests of more than 1,500 persons, as well as measures against newspapers, journalists, lawyers, professors, religious leaders, and others in the name of national "security");
farchenko, a Dissident, Goes on Trial in Soviet, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1981, at A5, col. 4;
PhiloppinesExpels Prieston Charge of Subversion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1981, at A7, col. 2;
Hanson,, AKorean In Prison, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1981, at A15, col. 1; Sarachik, As Soviet
Dissidents Continue to Suffer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1981, at A14, col. 6; South Africa Bans
Head ofJournalists'Group, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at A5, col. 2; Crackdown Under Way
in South Africa, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1981, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1981, at A9,
col. I (series of South African actions against journalists, union organizers, and students);
New Crackdown in Chile Greets Appealsfor Changes, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1980, at A2, col.
3; 15 Czechoslovak DissidentsReported Seized in Prague, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1980, at A5,
col. 2; 30,000 Defying Warning,ProtestMartialLaw in South Korean City, N.Y. Times, May
25, 1980, at A1, col. 3; Editorof BannedMagazine In Taiwan Gets 5 Years, N.Y. Times, May
16, 1980, at A8, col. 4; Rights Group Says Soviet Has Detained400 Dissidents, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 1980, at A6, col. 2; R. Falk, A World Order Perspective on Authoritarian Tendencies, Working Paper No. 10 (1980) (World Order Models Project). The list of rights violations in foreign countries could continue at length, but concerning matters closer to home,
the following should be added: "Editors from the United States, South Africa and Britain
said Tuesday their governments and courts are frustrating the public's right to know in the
name of national security. On the second day of the annual conference of the International
Press Institute, the editors said that Western governments increasingly are suppressing news,
formulating lies and 'colonizing the public.'" Hous. Post, May 7, 1980, at 12, col. 3.
8. 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (4-4 decision; Rehnquist, J., not participating; per curiam;
mem.), afig, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 938 (1981).
9. The effect of the four-four split is automatically to affirm the lower court ruling in
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), but note that Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No.
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tify and consider the general problem posed by recent claims of executive immunity from law, the legal policies at stake, and the
predominant trends in judicial decisions. A final section addresses
more specific questions raised with regard to a particular executive
function: the operation of our intelligence system.
I.

The Problem: Recent Executive Claims to
Immunity from Law

Some of the trends during the past few years have been alarming.
One hears more frequently of bills being drafted to allow the FBI and
the CIA to violate civil liberties. These proposed bills even include
attempts to shield government agents from prosecution for breaking the
law if they "were following orders,"' 0 a defense denied even to soldiers
79-1738 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 1982), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 959 (1981), may raise similar issues. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the Haperin vote but should be available to
participate in Fitzgerald,and Justice Stewart, who did participate, has retired. Nevertheless,
Justice Rehnquist has already gone "on record" in opposition to a Nixonian-type claim that
the President is not bound by law. While serving in his former position as Assistant Attorney General, he was quoted as saying that "the execution of any law is . . .an executive
function, and it seems an anomalous proposition that because the Executive branch is bound
to execute the laws, it is free to decline to execute them." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

LAW 195-96 (1978). See also Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492,
498 (4th Cir. 1973), vacatedandremanded, 420 U.S. 136 (1975). For a related point concerning a recent opinion by Justice Rehnquist, see text accompanying note 134 infra.
10. See, e.g., Tacticspreviously labeled abuses OK'd in GOP draft of FBIcharter, Hous.
Post, June 22, 1980, at 21A, col. 3. Retired Major General Lawrence Williams has written in
TIONAL

a related vein: "It can be expected that Executive privilege.

. .

may, .

.

. as an inherent

Constitutional power, allow the President to override laws [such as the Freedom of Information Act] requiring the divulging of general classes of information." Williams, Presidential
Protectionof Intelligence Information, 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP.no. 5, at 4 (May 1980) (emphasis added). In a 97-page report for
the Reagan Administration, the Heritage Foundation recommended that new legislative
measures exempt intelligence agencies from certain laws and even repeal the "criminal standard. . . now applied to [counterintelligence] surveillance operations." 2 A.B.A. STANDING
COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no. 12, at 2-3 (Dec. 1980). During
House hearings on a proposed CIA charter, Representative Robert McClory (R-Ill.) even
opposed prohibitions of assassination by CIA agents. 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. &
NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no. 4, at 2 (Apr. 1980).

At an A.B.A. Conference on Intelligence Legislation, held at the University of Chicago
Law School June 27-28, 1980, FBI Director William Webster indicated that such measures
are neither sought nor necessary. 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY,
INTELLIGENCE REP. no. 7, at 6 (July 1980). Director Webster also stated that Executive

Order No. 12036, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1979), reprintedin50 U.S.C. § 401, at 696-712 (1980), requires that FBI activities "must be conducted in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties," that the FBI has "found these controls entirely
workable," and that he is confident that both national security and civil liberty can be served
in the future. 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP.
no. 7, at 6 (July 1980). In a speech before tle Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
William Casey (now Director of the CIA) similarly declared, "I will cooperate fully in facili-
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acting in the heat of battle during a time of grave national emergency. 1'
More serious than such pernicious nonsense, however, are claims made
openly by government attorneys that the Executive, in certain contexts,
should not be bound by the Constitution or other elements of supreme
federal law. Although it is difficult to believe that such claims could be
made by attorneys working for a constitutional and democratic government, pledged as they are to uphold the United States Constitution,
these claims clearly have been made in at least three cases.
12
The first such attempt occurred in 1979. United States v. Tiede
was a criminal proceeding, the result of the diversion of a Polish airliner by two East Germans from its scheduled landing in East Berlin to
a landing in West Berlin. The United States prosecutors argued before
Federal District Judge Herbert Stem, sitting in a specially convened
tating the oversight through which Congress can ensure that the intelligence community
operates within the limits of the law. This will provide the American people with additional
assurance that U.S. intelligence will fully respect their civil liberties .... ." 3 A.B.A.
STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no. 2, at 3 (Feb. 1981).
Professors Antonin Scalia and James Q. Wilson expressed similar views at a 1980 meeting of the Consoriumfor the Study of Intelligence, Counterintelligence: Requirements/orthe
1980's, 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no 6, at 3
(June 1980). On June 3, 1980, the Senate approved S. 2284, the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980. Id. at 4. Under § 501(a)(3) of the bill, the Director of the CIA and heads of all other
governmental entities "involved in intelligence activities" must report "any illegal intelligence activity. . . and any corrective action that has been taken or is planned" to two Select
Committees of the Senate and House, presumably for the purpose of stopping "any illegal
intelligence activity." S.2284, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1980). Indeed, in view of the cases
noted at note 24 infra, which demonstrate that the President and all other governmental
officials are bound by the law, such a presumption would appear to be the only one that is
constitutionally permissible and is only strengthened by the recognition that our entire intelligence system is designed not to preserve a government as such, but to preserve a constitutional government and a free and democratic society. See also Remarks of Leonard
Theberge, Chairman of the ABA International Law Section, and John Shattuck, Director of
the ACLU's Washington Legislative Office, in ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY, LAW, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP 5, 58 (1979)
(Shattuck quoting A. BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN (1951)) [hereinafter cited as LAW,
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP]; notes 123 & 126-27 infra. President
Reagan's recent executive order, Exec. Order No. 12356, 45 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982), on
national security information affirms these latter expectations. It declares: "In no case shall
information be classified in order to conceal violations of law ... ." N.Y. Times, April 3,
1982, at 9, col. 3.
11. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 1 509, at 182-83 (1956); Principle IV, Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and
Judgment, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 12, U.N. Doec. A/1316 (1950); THE MILITARY IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 6-48, 6-66, 6-68 to 6-69; 6-74 to 6-96 (D. Zillman, A. Blaustein, E.
Sherman, et al, eds. 1978).
12. Crim. Case No. 78-OOIA (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprintedin 19 LL.M.
[International Legal Materials] 179 (1980). This case is ably reviewed in Gordon,American
Courts,InternationalLawand "PoliticalQuestions" Which Touch ForeignRelations, 14 INT'L
LAW. 297 (1980).
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United States court in Berlin,13 that both the proceedings and other
governmental actions did not have to comply with the United States
Constitution.' 4 The prosecution reasoned that because Berlin is a territory, governed as the result of military conquest, the court served only
as an instrument of foreign policy, unable to protect rights that were
not provided by the Secretary of State. The prosecution also argued
that, in the court's words, "everything which concerns the conduct of
[the government's occupation of a foreign territory] is a 'political question' not subject to court review."' 5 Despite such claims, Judge Stern
refused to deviate from legal and constitutional requirements, admonishing counsel for the government, "[Elverything American public officials do [at home or abroad] is governed by, measured against, and
must be authorized by the United States Constitution."16 As Judge
Stern aptly noted:
[T]here has never been a time when United States authorities exercised governmental powers in any geographical area-whether
at war or in times of peace-without regard for their own Constitution. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Nor has
there ever been a case in which constitutional officers, such as the
Secretary of State, have exercised
the powers of their office with17
out constitutional limitations.
Judge Stern further upheld the predominant trend and expectation that
judicial attention to law must not be lessened merely because of the
involvement of an executive power to conduct foreign relations. As far
as the court was concerned, the existence of "foreign affairs" implications and separate executive powers, even in an international crisis,
could never be raised to bar jurisdiction or to justify judicial inattention to the constitutionality, or permissibility under other federal law,
of United States executive actions at home or abroad. Quite properly,
the court noted that although laws might not directly regulate executive
discretion concerning the conduct of otherwise permissible governmen13. The court was established in 1955, during the occupation of Berlin by the Western
allies. The Tiede case was the first time the court had convened. Gordon, supra note 12, at
316-17 nn.88 & 90.
14. 19 I.L.M. at 188, 191-92, setting forth the exchange during trial between Judge Stern
and United States Attorney Surena. At issue was the right to a trial by jury and the more
general right to due process. Nevertheless, the court recognized the broad implications of
the prosecution's claim with respect to other constitutional protections, including the First
Amendment. See id. at 191.
15. Id. at 188.
16. Id. at 192. During the trial, the judge also noted that it was not only unthinkable
that conduct of government officials that thwarted due process standards would be permissible, but also that such conduct was ever contemplated. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 326.
17. 19 LL.M. at 190.

Summer 19821

PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

tal operations, the Executive, in choosing among permissible options,
must not violate the law. More specifically, the court recognized that
"the talismanic incantation of the word 'occupation' cannot foreclose
judicial inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the occupation, or
the personal rights of two defendants which are at stake."'"
Judge Stem's recognitions concerning the scope of executive and
judicial powers have not always been shared by all federal judges. In-

deed, the seemingly talismanic incantation of words like "crisis,"
"political," or "embarrassment," and phrases such as "national security," "governmental interests," "foreign affairs," "the conduct of our
international relations," or "interacting interests of the United States
and foreign nations" appears to have been reason enough for certain

other federal judges to abdicate their judicial power and responsibility
to identify, articulate, and apply constitutional or other supreme federal laws, even in the face of important allegations that such laws had
been violated.
For example, quite recently, in Rappenecker v. United States, Fed-

eral District Court Judge Schwarzer, finding nonjusticiable the claims
by former crewmen of the privately owned S.S. Mayaguez against the

United States Government for personal injuries suffered as a result of
United States military operations in response to the seizure of the vessel

by Cambodian gunboats, wrote, "The textual commitment to the President as commander in chief of authority for military decisions entails
that his decisions may be implemented without judicial scrutiny." 19
18. Id. at 193. On a related point, see Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01
(1932); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29, 147, 149, 153 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (Story, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64
(1967) ("the phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of.. . power which can be brought within its ambit. 'Even the war power does
not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.'" (citing Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-121 (1866), and quoting from Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)). The Robe! language is quoted in Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 89 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing, among others, United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88-89 (1921) (war context or war power does not obviate
protections under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919)).
19. Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (citing
Durand v. Holland, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,168)). For contrary decisions,
see cases cited in note 24 infra.
Curiously, the court seemed to ignore the point that a mere textual description of a
power is certainly not the same as a "textual commitment" of such a power solely to another
branch. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (not only
is there no explicit conferral of presidential power, but "the text of the Constitution does not
unquestionably commit the power. . . to the President alone"); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 519-23, 547-48 (1969); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-10 (1978).
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What seemed to impress the court was the indisputable but ever-present fact that "policy decisions" and a "basic policy judgment" were
involved2" and thus, perforce (we are led to believe), a nonjusticiable
"political question" existed. 2 ' Curiously, the court concluded that
claims arising out of the conduct of military operations "fall within the
class of claims arising out of determinations entrusted to the executive
branch and not22 subject to review by the courts, and are therefore
nonjusticiable."
What Judge Schwarzer seemed to ignore, however, is that although numerous "determinations" are "entrusted" to the Executive, a
fundamental expectation has predominated elsewhere under our constitutional system that the Executive, in carrying out its own powers
and responsibilities, is bound by the Constitution and other supreme
federal law.23 Unlike Judge Stem in the Tiede decision, Judge
Schwarzer appears to have been unaware of numerous cases that affirm
that the Executive has, indeed, no power or authority to act except in
accordance with the Constitution and the supreme law of the land.
More specifically, it has long been held that during the conduct of "mil20. Rappenecker, 509 F. Supp. at 1027.
21. Id. at 1026, 1028. Cf id. at 1028 ("[n]ot every question involving the exercise of
these powers is necessarily nonjusticiable"). See also id. at 1029-30.
22. Id. at 1030. See also id. at 1028-29.
23. See generally cases cited in note 24 infra; authorities cited in note 89 infra. Judge
Schwarzer also hinged his decision upon further conclusions reached while supposedly following "the reasoning of the Court in Baker v. Carr." 509 F. Supp. at 1029. For example,
he noted that "[t]he responsibility for dealing with foreign nations. . . is clearly committed
to the President." Id. This fact, however, would not support a conclusion that in exercising
such a responsibility the President could violate the law. Additionally, as Professor Gordon
points out, "the power to conduct foreign relations is not mentioned, as such, anywhere in
the text of the Constitution,. . . nor is it specifically allocated to one or another branch of
the federal government." Gordon, supra note 12, at 299. This fact would seem to be important to one relying on language in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that requires "a
textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Id.
at 217. See also note 19 supra.
Judge Schwarzer also stated that there were "no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the present issue." 509 F. Supp. at 1029. Nevertheless, if, as
alleged by plaintiffs, international law were violated during the exercise of such a presidential responsibility, the law provides such standards and, moreover, international law "must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly represented for their determination." The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 116
(1895); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,798 (D. Kan. 1980). at'dsub nor. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). On this point and its relation
to the so-called "political question" doctrine, see Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a
Better Understanding of Content, Authority and ConstitutionalChoice, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 226,
253-57 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Paust, The Concept of Norm]; Paust, Letter, 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 601 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Letter]; notes 89 & 148 infra.
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itary operations," the President of the United States is not only bound
by international law, which is part of the supreme law of the land
under article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, but is also subject to the

court's jurisdiction and thus to judicial review in order to remedy any
legal improprieties.2 4

24. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (voiding an executive seizure of an
enemy vessel in time of war); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29, 145,
147, 149, 153 (1815); The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804); Seery v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955). Seealso United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64
(1967); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presideitial order
reversed because President is bound by the Constitution in time of war); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (presidential order during war declaring martial law in
Hawaii voided as illegal); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932); United States
v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 233 (1887); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626-27
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (presidential authorization during time of war to suspend
writ of habeas corpus voided); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y.
1806) (No. 16,342) ("the law is paramount," and President, in exercising the war power,
cannot "authorize a person to do what the law forbids"); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 300 (1865)
(Constitution does not permit the Executive to abrogate international laws or authorize their
infraction); text accompanying notes 89, 131-32, 137-38 & 141-44 infra.
In United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342), the court
held that although no action was "voided" as such, a presidential order to do certain acts
that were illegal under both domestic and international law could not be allowed as a defense in the case of criminal prosecution. Id. at 1229-30. Similarly, a presidential or superior military officer's order "to do an illegal act . . . can afford no justification" for an
unlawful taking of property abroad in time of war. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
115, 137 (1852). Further, claims of "necessity" in time of war will be second-guessed by the
judiciary. Id. at 133-34. See also cases cited in notes 142-44 & 153 infra. In another case,
although the Court found no violation of international law, the plaintiff argued that a
United States officer was "limited by the Constitution and by the rules of international law
in his dealing with private rights" during a time of military occupation. See O'Reilly de
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 48 (1908) (plaintiff's argument appears at 52 L.Ed. 676, 676,
citing several cases and texts). Executive actions in time of peace have also been regulated
when violations of international law were at issue. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102, 120-21 (1933) (jurisdiction voided where U.S. government seized vessel in violation of
treaty that had "imposed a territorial limitation upon [U.S. government's] own authority");
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-79 (2d Cir.), reh ' denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d
Cir. 1974); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,795-800 (D. Kan. 1980), af'dsub non
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-90 (10th Cir. 1981); note 137 infra.
Dicta in some lower court opinions are clearly out-of-line with identifiable trends at the
Supreme Court level, both before and after the above-cited cases. For example, the district
court opinion in United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), ai'dsub nom.
United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970),
incorrectly stated that "[c]ourts have usually decided the constitutional questions concerning
international agreements, . . . but the corresponding question of international law has been
treated as a 'political question.' . . . Whether the actions by the executive. . . in utilizing
our armed forces are in accord with international law is a question which necessarily must
be left to the elected representatives of the people and not to the judiciary." 283 F. Supp. at
342 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Mass.
1968); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Mass. 1968). But see United
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Elsewhere in Judge Schwarzer's opinion are statements that are

also out-of-line with the case law.

5

For example, his opinion states

that "[i]t has long been settled that the underlying.

. .

legal determina-

tions on the basis of which the President conducts the foreign relations

of the United States are not subject to judicial scrutiny." 26 This is simply not true. No court has held before that "legal determinations"
made by the Executive, forming the basis of executive actions at home
or abroad, are beyond the purview of our courts. Both legal and nonlegal determinations have been ruled on by the judiciary when the law
has been violated.27 The cases Judge Schwarzer cited for this proposition actually dealt with matters that are traditionally left to executive
discretion-matters that concern little more than whether or not an Executive's recognition of a foreign government or the extent of its territorial claims presents a nonjusticiable question.28 As such, they are
unrelated to the general question of whether or not the President is
bound by law, and it is difficult, if not impossible, with even the most
unrestrained judicial logic, to assume from these cases that presidential
"legal determinations" are per se outside the jurisdiction of United
States courts.
As Professor Gordon recognized in a study of recent cases raising
claims of "political" questions, other cases have also contained simiStates v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 912 (D. Mass. 1969) (court "assumes without deciding"
that the United States Government did not intervene illegally in Vietnam and was not "using unlawful methods in Vietnam"). What these lower courts ignored were predominant
trends in decision noted above. In The Paquete Habana, for example, the Supreme Court
actually voided an executive action involving use of our armed forces in time of war precisely because it was violative of international law. Several other Supreme Court cases belie
the validity of overly broad statements made in the Berrigan opinion. Perhaps the Court
may have seen a distinction between a decision to engage in armed conflict and the application of law to specific acts occurring during a conflict, but international law applies to both.
25. These statements are addressed more thoroughly in text accompanying notes 126-60
infra.
26. Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. at 1028.
27. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra and note 89 infra. It is also worth noting that
in a case involving a denial of a permit to construct an off-shore drilling platform, the Court
of Claims allowed plaintiffs to obtain executive papers where these "might well lead to the
discovery. . . [that] the President or someone on his White House staff turned [the] application down and did so for impermissible, extraneous, political, or other reasons which they
think, if shown, would make their case." Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020, 1025
(Ct. Cl. 1975) (per curiam).
28. The main cases cited in Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. at 1028, were
Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656-57 (1854), and Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419-20 (1839). A related case, not cited in Rappenecker, is Occidental of
Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 928 (1979). This case has been criticized extensively by Professor Gordon, largely on
the ground that matters of international law were also involved and should not have been
ignored by the court. Gordon, supra note 12, at 303-04, 307-10.
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larly disturbing language. Among these is an absurd statement in a
Fifth Circuit opinion, Occidentalof Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo,29 that "[i]n their external relations, sovereigns are bound by no
law."' 30 Later in the same opinion, the same judge made an equally
egregious remark: "Should the president ever officially act on a polit31
ical issue, we would be constitutionally bound to accept his act."
What this latter statement necessarily, but incorrectly, assumes is that
when a president acts politically in a general sense, ie., "on a political
issue," he may act in any way whatsoever and thus in violation of the
Constitution or other supreme federal law. Richard Nixon undoubtedly would have welcomed such an excuse, but, as the Supreme Court
emphatically has held, such a broad exclusion of judicial power and
presidential duty remains constitutionally unacceptable.3
Professor Gordon's study also contains an important reply to
counsel for the government on the subject of the abdication of judicial
power when important matters of "foreign affairs" or "national interest" are involved. When counsel continued to stress these considerations before Judge Stern, the judge replied:
When was it that Judges were supposed to worry about that
in deciding what the law is? When was it permissible under the
oath you took as an attorney, and a member of the Bar, for
Judges to care about that in construing the fights of human beings? And when did it become permissible for lawyers in a courtroom or a litigant to tell the Judge that the piece of litigation is so
important to the litigant that the Judge is ordered to find a certain
way? What system of justice are you referring to? What jurisprudence were you trained in that you should make such references? What court do you know of in the whole American [legal
system] that functions this way? What Judge would do it for
you?
.. . That's a vile thing for a Judge to listen to. He can't be a
Judge if he listens to that.
29. 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
30. 577 F.2d at 1204-05, quotedin Gordon, supra note 12, at 303. It is also possible that
Judge Morgan, the author of the Occidentalopinion, confused sovereignty, held by the people of the United States, with the executive branch, a misconception explored in more detail
below. See notes 59, 109-12 & 114-15 infra. See also note 5 supra.
31. 577 F.2d at 1205 n.16.
32. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). On Nixon's putative justifications,
see also Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 622; Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee,60 CORNELL L. RaV. 231, 240-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Human Rights]. The Court also has recognized that the mere fact that
important political issues are involved and important political consequences might follow
from a decision of the Court, the case or controversy before the Court does not thereby
involve a nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962);
J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 100.
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Human beings can be adjudged guilty if it is important

enough to the state, guilty or not, as long as it is important
enough to the state or to the allies of the state or to the community of the world. When can it become permissible for Judges to
consider that?33
What Judge Stern could not foresee was that in Narenji v. Civiletli,34 several judges for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would base their holding in the Iranian deportation case on

similar matters of executive concern. Despite documented claims that
constitutional and human rights were being violated by the executive
branch during its attempt to deport Iranian students, and the accept-

ance of amicus briefs on the need for the judicial branch to enforce
international law even against an unwilling executive, the majority
opinions neglected these issues. They did, however, incorporate several

of the touchstone phrases complained of by Judge Stern. The majority
opinion, for example, speaks of "foreign affairs," a "crisis," and "foreign policy,"35 as if such matters obviate the need for inquiry into
whether or not the President has violated the United States Constitu-

tion and international law. Judge Robb, writing for the majority in
Narenji, declined jurisdiction, reasoning: "[I]t is not the business of
courts to pass judgment on the decisions of the President in the field of
foreign policy."3 6 Elsewhere, he noted, "The present controversy in33. Record, vol. 2, at 86-88, Dostal v. Benedict, Civ. Case No. 79-1 (U.S. Court for
Berlin 1979), quoted in Gordon, supra note 12, at 328.
34. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). Narenji involved
the constitutionality of a regulation requiring students who were natives or citizens of Iran to
provide information as to their residences and maintenances of nonimmigration status in
preparation for a major effort to deport Iranians.
35. 617 F.2d at 747-49.
36. Id. at 748. Judge Robb also declared that when the lower court found the executive
action to be unconstitutionally discriminatory, "the District Court undertook to evaluate the
policy reasons upon which the regulation is based. . . .In doing this the court went beyond
an acceptable judicial role." Id. Since the circuit court also looked at several "policy reasons" in order to support its choice, it must not be impermissible per se to evaluate policy
reasons. One must assume that what Judge Robb really meant was that if a court uses policy
reasons to deny the validity of an executive decision, it is not engaged in an "acceptable"
judicial role, but if it uses policy reasons to justify an executive decision, then the court is
engaged in an "acceptable" role. Contrary to such an assumption, the Supreme Court has
engaged in a second-guessing both of legal and nonlegal determinations made by the Executive, even in times of war or other national "crisis" or emergency, when law has been violated. See note 24 supra; notes 89 & 131-56 and accompanying text infra. When such an
allegation has been made, the Court has proceeded to make a determination on the specific
issue(s) raised. For this reason, Judge Robb's proffered formula for deference to the Executive (tie., if only the executive actions "are not wholly irrational they must be sustained," 617
F.2d at 747) must be opposed whenever law has been violated. Otherwise, courts would
entertain the most ludicrous of arguments about the whole irrationality versus partial irrationality of any illegalities perpetrated by the President. For the jurisprudential point, see
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volving Iranian students in the United States lies in the field of our
country's foreign affairs and implicates matters over which the President has direct constitutional authority."37 What Judge Robb seems
incorrectly to have assumed, as did the Fifth Circuit opinion in Occi-

dental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc.,38 is that whenever a president has
general constitutional authority to act and "foreign affairs" are involved, the president may act in any way whatsoever and thus in violation of law. Numerous cases stand in opposition to such an
assumption, most importantly in this instance, The PaqueteHabana.39
Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense andthe Functional.Approach,35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 819
(1935), generally condemning the so-called rational basis test as a mental institution test that
also is far too myopic when compared with one that takes into account all aspects of law and
all relevant legal policies at stake.
37. 617 F.2d at 748.
38. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra. A similar notion was advanced by the
United States Attorney in the Tiede case. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
39. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See generally cases cited in notes 23-24 supra; notes 136 & 141
infra; authorities cited in note 89 infra. In The PaqueteHabana, the President clearly had
direct constitutional authority to act in time of war, but his specific actions in furtherance of
that otherwise appropriate mandate were found to be violative of the law of the land and
were therefore voided.
Most importantly, the United States Government has recently recognized, in a suit involving foreign officials, that lawsuits involving breaches of international human rights law
may properly be brought before our courts. In its amicus curiae memorandum before the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, the government declared, "Because foreign officials are
among the prospective defendants in suits alleging violations of fundamental human rights,
such suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy considerations. But not every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Like many
other areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is
not committed exclusively to the political branches of government ....
"The courts are properly confined to determining whether an individual has suffered a
denial of rights guaranteed him as an individual by customary international law ....
[In
such a case,] there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy
efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection
of human rights. As we have shown ... . official torture is both clearly defined and universally condemned. Therefore, private enforcement is entirely appropriate." Memorandum
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, Filartiga v. Peila-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), reprintedin 19 LL.M. 585 (1980) (citations omitted). Compare the above approach to "political" versus "legal" questions with Paust, Letter, supra note 23. If international law has been violated, the "political" question, sovereign immunity, and the act of
state doctrines should present no real difficulty for claimants against foreign governments or
foreign government officials. See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259
(D.D.C. 1980) (awarding damages partially based on international law); Letelier v. Republic
of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (upholding subject. matter jurisdiction over
foreign government for civil liability if that government ordered an assassination that took
place in the United States); Paust, The Mexican Oil Spill: Jurisdiction,Immunity, andActs of
State, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 239, 252-53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Paust, The Mexican Oil
Spill]; Paust, Letter, supra note 23, at 601-08. Even as a matter of reciprocity, our govern-
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Judge Robb also seemed impressed by an affidavit from the Attor-

ney General stating that his regulation was issued "as an element of the
language of diplomacy.

. .

in response to actions by foreign countries.

The action implemented by these regulations is therefore a fundamental element of the President's efforts to resolve the Iranian crisis."4 0 As
Judge MacKinnon added in concurrence, "in the situation with which
we are here dealing, the President's power is at its zenith-right up to
the brink of war."'" What these judges did not address, however, is the
fact that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have often
stressed that, even in time of war, when executive powers are admittedly at their highest, the President is bound by international and
United States constitutional law.4' A crisis circumstance, even war,

does not obviate judicial power and responsibility.
In opposition to the denial of a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge
Wright and Judges Spottswood, Robinson, Wald, and Mikva noted

problems posed by "selective law enforcement" 43 involving, really, a
form of unlawful collective punishment,'

discrimination, 45 and retalia-

ment and officials should clearly have been subject to such claims by the Iranian litigants in
the Narenji case. See also note 47 infra.
40. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d at 747 (quoting an affidavit from the Attorney General). Judge Robb continued, "Thus the present controversy... lies in the field of our
country's foreign affairs. . . ." Id. at 748. An appropriate response is"So what?" See also
note 39 supra; text accompanying note 42 infra.
41. 617 F.2d at 753 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon would have allowed the President to go even further, regardless of international law. For Judge MacKinnon, the "international crisis and confrontation in Iran" meant that even innocent human
beings, because of their nationality, "create a clear and present danger" and, thus, can be
"located... so that the Government may immediately take proper security measures." Id.
at 752. This he argued even in the face of federal decisions that now recognize that governmental actions taken against aliens that are motivated by a retaliatory purpose or that discriminate against nationals of a particular country are patently violative of international law
despite coercion engaged in by their home country and by such government. See notes 4546 infra. Judge MacKinnon even admitted that, in this case, "[t]he disparity in treatment
.. .is based upon the fact that the Government of their home country has committed [unlawful acts]." 617 F.2d at 749 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). See also id. at 751; id. at 747
(admission of the Attorney General in this regard). Because the right of free speech by
certain Iranians was at stake, Judge MacKinnon's proffered remedy also has grave implications for the continued viability of an "unchilled" First Amendment.
42. See cases cited in note 24supra;notes 138-51 infra; authorities cited in note 89 infra.
43. 617 F.2d at 754 (joint statement of Wright, C.J., Spottswood, Robinson, Wald, and
Mikva, JJ., in support of rehearing en banc).
44. Functionally, Iranians, and no others, were singled out and punished as a responsive measure, in effect because of the conduct of other persons who were acting outside of
our borders. Both human rights law and United States case law recognize that collective
punishment, that is, the punishment of persons not for what they have done as individuals,
but for the acts of others, is impermissible. In Communist Party v. United States, 384 F.2d
957 (D.C. Cir. 1967), for example, the court found that governmental schemes premised on
action that "in essence comprehends the collective punishment of [individual] persons" must
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be condemned under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 967. The prohibition in human rights
law is evidenced in many related prohibitions, see, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(1955) (prohibition against collective punishment in time of armed conflict); 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 4, art. 4 (prohibition against "collective expulsion of aliens"). See also Convention No. IV, Respecting Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 50, 36 Stat. 2277, 2307, T.S. No. 539 (declared customary
international law at Nuremberg). I Trials Major War Crimes 253-54 (1947) (no collective
penalties); United States v. List, reprintedin 11 Trials of War Criminals 757, 1248-53, 1270
(1950).
Of no less import is the fact that any form of collective punishment would violate the
right of individuals to human dignity, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. I, G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), would necessarily deprive individuals of their right to be
treated as individuals and be recognized "as a person before the law," id. at art. 6, would
necessarily violate the right of the individual to be "presumed innocent," id. at art. 11, would
subject the individual to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," id. at art. 5, and
would most likely involve a prohibited "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile," id. at art. 9.
Clearly an affimation of individual worth and dignity-precepts that are also recognized in the preamble to the United Nations Charter-requires that individuals be punished
only for what they, as individuals, have done. As Justice Murphy rightly warned in another
context, "[t]o infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify
discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights. . . [and] to adopt one of the cruelest
of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the
passions of tomorrow." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
As our courts have declared repeatedly, guilt must be personal; collective guilt is alien
to our jurisprudence and to American values. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178
(1951) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 154 (1943); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 582 (E.D. Tex.
1978) (recognizing the common constitutional expectation that disabilities, burdens, or penalties imposed must be related to personal guilt or individual responsibility) (citing Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423,425 (5th
Cir. 1974)), af'd, Plyler v. Doe, 50 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S. 1982) (No. 80-1538). What is also
clear is the fact that these prohibitions apply to federal deportation measures that are violative of the principle of personal guilt, and thus promote an impermissible "guilt by association." See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
45. Discrimination on the basis of "national or ethnic origin" has been recognized by
the International Court of Justice as "a denial of fundamental human rights [and] is a
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter" of the United Nations.
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57. The government
of the United States clearly agrees with this proposition. See Memorial of the United States
before the International Court of Justice at 71, in Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 1. Furthermore, several United
States laws prohibit governmental participation in conduct involving discrimination on the
basis of "national origin." See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2755 (1976) (the Arms Export Control Act);
22 U.S.C. § 2661(a) (1976) (the 1977 Foreign Relations Authorization Act); 22 U.S.C. § 2426
(1976) (the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2314(g) (1976) (the Foreign Assistance Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a-l, 2000d (1976)
(the 1964 Civil Rights Act). See also Note, Narenji v. Civiletti: Expediency Triumphes Over
Aliens' ConstitutionalRights, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. (1981); Note, Aliens-Constitutionalityof
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tory purpose. 46 At the conclusion of their opinion, they issued a trenchant warning that, unfortunately, still has gone unheeded by some.
"These cases do. . . raise a grave constitutional issue. When the rule
of law is being compromised by expediency in many places in the
world, it is crucial for our courts to make certain that the United States
does not retaliate in kind. 47
Before the United States Supreme Court, during an attempted appeal, United States Attorneys McCree, Daniel, Kopp, Steinmeyer, and
Singer openly argued against such a notion: "The Constitution does
not forbid the President.

.

. to violate international law, and the courts

will give effect to acts within the constitutional powers of the political
branches without regard to international law."48 Although case law belies the validity of such an argument, government attorneys openly argued once again that, in certain circumstances, the President of the
United States should not be bound by the Constitution or other
supreme federal law.
DiscriminationBased on NationalOrigin--Narenjiv. Civiletti, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 48287 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Aliens].
46. Federal cases recognize that governmental actions taken against aliens that are
"motivated by a retaliatory purpose" or that discriminate against nationals of a particular
country are patently violative of international law and will not be enforced, upheld, or recognized in this country. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 170, 18385 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 307
F.2d 845, 861, 864-68 (1962); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp.
1004, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
402-03 (1964) (recognizing the State Department position on the violations of international
law, as printed at 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 171 (Aug. 1, 1960)). With regard to the Court's "balance" test, it should be noted that since the Executive cannot lawfully violate international
law, there can be no legitimate federal interest (compelling or otherwise) in retaliatory violations of international law or in the collective punishment of persons in violation of fundamental human rights and more general norms of international law. See also Gordon &
Lichtenstein, Trends: The Decision to Block Iranian Assets-Reexamined, 16 INT'L LAW.
161, 164-65 (1982); Note, Aliens, supra note 45, at 487-90, 492-94.
47. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d at 755 (joint statement of Wright, C.J., Spottswood,
Robinson, Wald, and Mikva, JJ., in support of rehearing en banc). Other judges have taken
similar stands in protecting Iranians in this country. See, e.g., Judge Not Wrathful, Clears
Iranian Student, L.A. Times, July 25, 1980, at 11, col. 1 (Municipal Court Judge Harris,
explaining, "No consideration can or should be given to the fact that this defendant is of a
nationality notorious to the American public"); Judge Clears 105 IraniansSeized at Rally,
L.A. Times, July 19, 1980, at 1,col. 2 (Municipal Court Judge Boags writing, "As an American citizen, I am outraged at our people being held hostage in Iran and, frankly, there was a
tendency to say turnabout is fair play. But, while that may seem like justice out in the
streets, it has no place in a court of law"). For similar juristic views, see notes 44-46 supra.
48. Respondents Brief in Opposition at 18, Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITuTION 222 (1972)).
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It is noteworthy that in the more disturbing "foreign affairs" and
international law cases disclosed above, one professorial work is often
used by those judges and attorneys who would support the claim that
the President should not be bound by international law. That work,
cited without question or attention to the actual trends in the case law
as noted in Part II of this article, is the book, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution, prepared by Professor Louis Henkin.4 9 The language
quoted in the government's brief before the Supreme Court in the Iranian deportation case and noted above is, in fact, Professor Henkin's.1°
Since Professor Henkin's work has been cited to support this mis-

conception regarding presidential power, his statements are worthy of
our attention, even though Professor Henkin would himself admit that
"[tihere are no clear Supreme Court holdings, or even explicit dicta,
upholding the power of the President to act contrary to international

law."'" Such a realization does not restrain him, however, from making remarks like those quoted above52--remarks that rest ultimately

upon mere belief, and thus a personal preference, 53 and that are supported only by a misreading of dicta by Chief Justice Marshall in
Brown v. UnitedStates, 4 a misreading copied by government attorneys
49. L. HENKIN, supra note 48. Professor Henkin's work was also cited similarly in Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. at 1029.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. L. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 460 n.61.
52. See, e.g., id. at 165 n.t (President can break or terminate treaties); id. at 170-71
(President can breach a treaty); id. at 188, 222, 460-61 (President can act regardless of treaty
obligations). But see id. at 55 ("[the President] shall enforce the law of the United States
(including international law and obligations.. .)"). As a member of a panel of the American Society of International Law on The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy,
Professor Henkin apparently approved a recommendation that "we should do our utmost to
have the two branches act together within a framework of law, especially on the vital issues
of war and peace." Recommendation No. 5 concerning The Power to Wage War (emphasis
added), reprintedin THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY xiv, 4 (F.
Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976).
53. See L. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 460 n.61: "There are no clear Supreme Court
holdings, or even explicit dicta, . .. but the principle is, I believe, the same."
54. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 153 (1815). The only other possible footnoted "support" for
such a dangerous allegation lies in an even more irrelevant quotation from another Supreme
Court opinion: "'This court is not a censor of the morals of the other departments of the
government."' L. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 419 n.139 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889)). The "morals" of another department are not directly
relevant, and the quoted language is irrelevant to whether or not the President is bound by
law. See also Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 803-04
n.131 (1976) (power to terminate does not imply power to breach law while it remains law);
Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons? A ConfigurativeApproach to Decision
IntegratingInternationaland Domestic Law, 18 HARV. INTL L.J. 19, 43-4 (1977) (President
bound by law while it is law, despite power to terminate treaties).
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in their brief before the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Marshall's statement is innocuous enough if properly
uniderstood. All that he actually declared was that "usage is a guide
which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will.

'56

What seems

curiously to have escaped attention is the significant fact that mere "usage" is not the equivalent of law and that "usage" has a definite meaning for international lawyers.5 7 Moreover, the word "law" was not
used by Chief Justice Marshall in this sentence, although it was utilized
nearby to affirm just the opposite of Professor Henkin's belief, to wit:
that the President "can pursue only the law as it is written," as opposed
to his unilateral preference, and that he is restrained to such acts as are
allowed by the laws.58 Professor Henkin also seems to fall into error by
equating the President with "the sovereign."'59
Also worth mentioning in this section on disturbing claims to immunity from law are a series of developments occurring with regard to
bilateral prisoner exchange agreements between the United States and
several foreign countries. 60 These are relevant because, although the
55. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
56. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128.
57. See, e.g., Mauran v. Smith, 8 R.I. 192, 222-23, 5 Am. Rep. 564, 571-72 (1865) ("usage and practice of war" does not mean the "rules and articles of war" or, by implication,
the law of war); I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (8th ed. 1955); UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF ARMY PAMPHLET 27-161-1, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 n.45 (1964) (distinguishing
customary law from mere usage and adding that usage is habitual conduct engaged in "without any conviction of its legally obligatory nature and as a result of mere comity"). See also
United States ex rel. E & R Constr. Co. v. Guy H. James Constr. Co., 390 F. Supp. 1193,
1209 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Power v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 123-24, 54 N.W. 404, 410 (1893);
American Lead Pencil Co. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 124 Tenn. 57, 64, 134 S.W. 613, 615
(1911). An early opinion of Attorney General Randolph also demonstrated the then current
expectation that "until. . .usages shall have grown into principles, and are incorporated
into the law of nations," they remain mere usages. I Op. Att'y Gen. 32, 37-38 (1793).
58. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128-29.
59. See L. HENKiN, supra note 48, at 22-27, 83-84, 168, 460. Compare text accompanying notes 5 & 30 supra, with notes 109-15 and accompanying text infra. In our country,
sovereignty and authority exist with the people. See notes 110-11 infra. For this and other
reasons set forth below, any attribution of "sovereign" powers that some foreign government
might possess to our President would be misplaced. Our entire government is one of delegated powers. It has no power except that granted by the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 62-64 & 109-15 infra.
60. See, e.g., Abramovsky,4 CriticalEvaluationofthe American Transfer ofPenalSanctions Policy, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 25 (1980); Abramovsky & Eagle, A CriticalEvaluation ofthe
Mexican-American Transfer of PenalSanctions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REv. 275 (1979); Bassiouni, Perspectiveson the Transferof PrisonersBetween the UnitedStates andMexico andthe
UnitedStates and Canada, 11 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1978); Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention of Mexican and Canadian Prisonersby the United States Government, 12
VAND.J.TRANSNAT'L L. 67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention]; Robbins, 4 ConstitutionalAnalysis of the ProhibitionAgainst CollateralAttack in the
Mexican-American PrisonerExchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1978); Vagts, 4 Revly
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United States Government has no constitutional power to incarcerate

individuals who are prosecuted for violating a domestic law not authorized by Congress in a tribunal that has not been authorized by Congress or the Constitution and that utilizes unconstitutional procedures,
the United States Government has participated in such an incarcera-

tion of American citizens by implementing prisoner transfer agreements. 6 ' Thus, the government seeks to act, by implementing
international agreements, free from the restraints of the United States

Constitution.
Since the power and authority of the government "have no other
source [and the government] can only act in accordance with all the

limitations imposed by the Constitution ....
.[it having] no power
except that granted by the Constitution"; 61 since "no agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Consti64
tution"; 63 since no federal power exists to so incarcerate Americans;

and since the government is participating still in such an incarceration
of American citizens; these developments amount to an impermissible
claim by the executive branch, approved by Congress, 65 that it be allowed to act as if it were immune from the Constitution of the United
States. As explained in other writings, federal courts should uphold the
to '"4 CriticalEvaluationof the Mexican-American Transfer ofPenalSanctions Treaty", 64
IOWA L. REv.325 (1979); Letter to the Editor from E. Freeman, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980,
at A18, col. 4. Most of these sources address questions of rights, waivers, and consent, but
do not adequately address a more fundamental question of whether or not any federal
power exists to incarcerate Americans who have violated neither United States' nor international laws.
61. See, e.g., Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention, supra note 60, at 67-69, 71-72;
Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention ofPrisonersby the United States Under Exchange of
Prisoner Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECrS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 204 (R. Lillich ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention ofPrisoners].
62. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6, 12 (1957). Seealso Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1922); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866); Bauer v. Acheson, 106
F. Supp. 445, 449, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1952); United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-001A
(U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprintedin 19 LL.M. 179 (1979), quotedin text accompanying notes 16-17 supra; notes 110-15 and accompanying text infra.
63. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 16.
64. See articles cited in note 61 supra, See also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 521 (1821) (no
presidential power to arrest anyone except for violation of our laws or possibly to extradite);
I Op. Att'y Gen. 406, 408 (1820) (relevant British expectation that government can "inflict
no punishment upon any [person] ... unless warranted by the law of the land").
65. There has been congressional implementing legislation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3244
(Supp. II 1978). Nevertheless, Congress cannot obtain powers that do not exist through a
treaty and its own acts any more than the President. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text
supra.
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Constitution in the face of such a subversive threat to law and void

attempted exercises of power not delegated by the Constitution.66 Similar threats occur and should be similarly voided where the government

knowingly involves itself in foreign state illegalities by subsequently
incarcerating the victims of such illegalities, especially if human rights
deprivations have occurred.67
Perhaps equally or even more disturbing in view of Richard
Nixon's claim that "governmental interests" should be considered to
outweigh public interests and democratic freedoms, 65 is the language
from Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Haig v. Agee.6 9 In providing the

Secretary of State with broad discretion to deny travel abroad under an
American passport to citizens whom the Secretary believes pose a

threat to national security, the Chief Justice expressly recognized that
even an "exclusive power of the President.

.

. in the field of interna-

tional relations" is a power that "must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution."70 Nevertheless, he declared that "freedom to travel abroad with a . . . passport . . . is

subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations...
[or] to reasonable governmental regulation."'" The Chief Justice ad-

ded: "[N1o governmental interest is more compelling than the security
of the Nation . . . . Protection of the foreign policy of the United
States is a governmental interest of great importance . . . [and
m]easures to protect the secrecy of our Government's foreign intelligence operations plainly serve these interests."7 "

Although his opinion is unclear on this point, presumably the
existence of compelling or important "governmental interests" and
measures needed to "serve these interests" were primary factors leading

to his conclusion that the constitutional freedom being considered
should be "subordinate to national security and foreign policy consid66. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6, 12 (1957); Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Stover, 60 F.
Supp. 587, 593 (S.D. Ill. 1945); articles cited in note 61 supra. See also Exparte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866). Several other cases suggest the same sort of remedy. See, e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'dinpart,
452 U.S. 713 (1981) (4-4 decision; Rehnquist, J., not participating). See also United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. See articles cited in note 61 supra.
68. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); Paust, Human Rights, supra
note 32, at 243 n.35.
69. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
70. Id. at 289 n.17 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936)).
71. 453 U.S. at 306.
72. Id. at 307.
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erations." 7 The Chief Justice may have reaffirmed the long-recognized expectation that the President cannot violate the Constitution in

the name of "national security" or "foreign policy considerations," but
that reaffirmance may make little difference if previously recognized
constitutional freedoms are interpreted away or depleted in order to
serve those same executive "considerations" or to assure that "govern-

mental interests" in "national security and foreign policy" will always
prevail. The point is all the more disturbing in view of the fact that the
government will often have "interests" or "considerations" at stake

when national security or foreign policy is somehow involved.
Moreover, in light of Richard Nixon's claims that the President
can ignore the supreme law of the land in order to protect the national
security and that "governmental interests" can outweigh public interests, the danger inherent in what appears to be an approach to constitutional choice that favors "national security and foreign policy
considerations" 74 seems potentially to be even more threatening to our

constitutional process when these "considerations" are couched, not in
terms of democratic values and the public interest, but in terms of a

potentially antagonistic and more limited standard termed "govern-

mental interest." 75 If governmental interests are to outweigh public in-

terests and democratic values (either through an open balance or
through a failure to address effects upon public interests and democratic values at stake while "balancing" merely governmental interests
as such), then the Chief Justice, at least, seems to have accepted one of
73. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
74. See also NationalSecurity-a Legal Shft, L.A. Times, July 12, 1981, at 1, col. I
(quoting Professor Gerald Gunther on the point that when confronted with these interests,
the Court "brushes off the civil liberties questions quite summarily"). Actually, the Chief
Justice may have acted like any other "activist" or "value-oriented" judge while interpreting
the content of "rights," and may simply prefer "national security" values over "civil liberties" values in an Agee-type context. In this sense, to paraphrase Justice Brennan's dissent,
"[t]he reach. . is potentially staggering." 453 U.S. 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Agee decision may thwart First Amendment policies at stake and reach "other citizens who
may merely disagree with Government foreign policy and express their views." Id. On this
jurisprudential point, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979) ("[w]hat process is constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being
made"). Chief Justice Burger's result-oriented approach is "potentially" even more "staggering" when .one realizes that although he claims to rely in the Agee case on Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), he seems to use things "important" to the
government and "national security" as factors that outweigh "rights" that are potentially at
stake-despite the rejection by six of the justices deciding Youngstown of these very factors
as overriding. See note 144 infra.
75. See also Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32, at 243; note 6 supra;text accompanying notes 182-83 infra, on the point that the human rights test is not a compelling "governmental interest" test, but a higher standard based on necessity, public interests, and the
fundamental conditioning phrase "democratic society."
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Richard Nixon's earlier claims. In any event, an end run (e.g., an interpretive approach that makes the "fights" to be interpreted "subordinate
to national security and foreign policy") would seem to be just as dangerous as a frontal assault (e.g., a claim that the Executive can disregard law when "national security and foreign policy" are to be served).
In view of the general legal policies at stake and predominant trends in
the case law, both attempts at derogation should be condemned.
I.

Legal Policies at Stake

Of the general legal policies at stake in considering the extent of
executive power, one fairly specific constitutional provision stands out.
Article II, section 3 of the federal Constitution charges the President to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Also of import is the
constitutionally prescribed oath of office that the President must take.
It demands that the President "to the best of. . . [his] Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."7 6 As commentators generally affirm, these provisions create a constitutional
"duty to see that the laws are enforced"7 7 and that the Constitution is
preserved and protected.7 8 Early opinions of United States attorneys
general also affirm "the constitutional duty of the President to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, ' 79 and therefore also to "take care
that [lower federal officials] execute their duties faithfully and
honestly." 80
What follows necessarily from these recognized duties are the accepted conclusions that the President must obey the law,8" including
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
77. E. CORWIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 82 (4th ed. 1967). See also M.
FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (2d ed. 1969); A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 105-06; J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 214; B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 178-79 (2d ed. 1979); L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 187, 191-92; text accompanying notes
102-05 infra.
78. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 178; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 19, at 4-5; L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 201; text accompanying notes 103 & 107
infra.
79. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516 (1846). For similar recognitions, see 5Op. Att'y Gen. 630,
635, 656 (1852); 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 287, 288 (1851); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 508 (1832); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822).
80. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516 (1846); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823).
81. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 105-06, 109-10; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77,
at 178-79; Karst & Horowitz, PresidentialPrerogativeand JudicialReview, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 47, 53 (1974) ("deeply held popular sentiment that not even a President is above the
law"); id. at 67 (in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), most important thing the
Court did was reaffirm that Executive is "under the law" and his "claim of discretionary
power" is subject "to the limits of the law"); Winterton, The Concept ofExtra-Constitutional
Executive Power in DomesticAffairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 35 (1979). See also 11 Op.
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the Constitution, 2 and thus must respect the constitutional rights of
others.8 3 A related expectation, although less widely recognized, is that
the President can be prosecuted for violations of the law.84 Alexander
Hamilton stressed this numerous times in the FederalistPapers. After

impeachment, for example, the President would "be liable to prosecu' "would be ametion and punishment in the ordinary course of law,"85
nable to personal punishment and disgrace,"86 and would be subject
"to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the
common course of law."' 87 More recently, a court has ruled that the
Att'y Gen. 297, 300 (1865) (Constitution does not permit President to abrogate international
law or authorize violations thereof); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822) (President bound
by treaties and also by the general or customary law of nations); W. WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS 16, 32 (2d ed. 1920); Dean, Is the President'sPower Exclusive?, 55
ALB. L.J. 376, 378-79 (1897); Goldberg, The ConstitutionalLimitations on the President's
Powers, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 667, 671, 673, 675, 683 (1973); Karst & Horowitz, supra, at 54
(idea from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803), that political discretion ends
where the law imposes a duty-thus, there can be no executive discretion to violate the law);
id. at 64 ("presidential discretion must give way. . . to the demands of the law"); Mishkin,
Great Casesand Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 76,
80, 86, 90 (1974) (President's subjection to law was the great public issue in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)); Wormuth,-Yhe Nixon Theory ofthe War Power. 4 Critique, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 623, 625-26, 628, 634, 641-42 (President bound by international law), 644,
652 (President bound by Constitution), 664-65 (1972); Berger, Mr. Nixon's Refusal of Subpoenas: "4 Confrontation with the Nation," N.Y. Times, July 8, 1974, at 29, col. 1; Letter to
Editor from L. Tribe, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1974, at A40, col. 5. See also A. MILLER, supra
note 3, at 105-06, 109-10; L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 16 (Supp. 1979) (Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that federal executive officials are not above the law in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)); text accompanying notes 102-05 infra. But see A. MILLER, supra
note 3, at 117-18, 213-14.
82. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 106; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 19, at 8; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 178-79, 183; Goldberg, supra note 81;
Wormuth, supra note 81, at 652; Berger, supra note 81; text accompanying notes 103 & 107
infra. See also I Op. Att'y Gen. 229, 230 (1818); L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 164-67, 169-7 1.
83. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 178, 183; L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 167,
201; Remarks of John Shattuck, in LAW, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP, supra note 10, at 57; Remarks of Professor Robert Bork, id. at 59, 64, 69-70 (but
adding that a second question is, of course, whether or not one has a constitutional right);
cases cited in note 88 infra; text accompanying note 103 infra See also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 229,
229-30 (1818).
84. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 201. Cf.L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 316-17
(2d ed. 1978) (President should be prosecuted "for official malfeasance"); L. TRIBE, supra
note 9, at 201. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (9th ed. 1975) (citing a
Justice Dep't memo); Berger, The Incarnationof Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4,
19 (1974) (President can be arrested). But see J.STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 418-19 (1833) (President not subject to arrest "while he is in
the discharge of the duties of his office").
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton). See also id. No. 83 (offenses against the
government for which the persons who commit them may be indicted and punished).
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (A. Hamilton). See also id. No. 70.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (A. Hamilton).
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President can be held personally liable for money damages arising out
of a presidentially directed violation of an individual's constitutional
rights, even where such a violation was ordered in the name of "na-

tional security.

'8 8

It is evident from this and other cases that, even in the face of

claims involving national security, war, or foreign affairs, the President's activities can be restricted either by the judiciary or by Congress.89 Other recognized remedies have, in fact, included the voiding
of a presidential act;90 normal remedies of criminal defendants; 9 1 the
88. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, 452
U.S. 713 (1981). See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 187, 191-92 (citing Halperin v. Kissinger, 424
F. Supp. 838, 843, 845 (D.D.C. 1976)). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In
Butz, Justice White declared, "The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability
to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional guarantees ... [and with regard to higher ranked officials]. the greater power of
such officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct. Extensive Government operations offer opportunities for unconstitutional action on a massive scale. In situations of abuse, an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important
means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." 438 U.S. at 505-06. Importantly, Justice
White's language did not exclude the liability of a president; furthermore, he added: "'Our
system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position
in government, are subject to federal law ....
'" Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). See text accompanying note 132 infra. Other cases also have recognized that federal officials who are responsible for enforcing the law can be held personally
liable for damages when they wilfully fail to implement the law. See National Black Police
Ass'n v. Velde, 631 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also note 110 infra.
89. See Dean, supra note 81, at 378 (the proximity of the receipt of ambassadors clause
to the "take care that the laws are faithfully executed" clause clearly demonstrates "that in
his foreign relations activities [the President] was still subject to the law"); Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 5, at 13-20, 24-26; Goldberg, supra note 81; Shattuck, supra note 83; Wormuth, supra note 81. See also L. TRIBE,supra note 9, at 164-67, 169-71 ("[F]oreign policy
choices and their implementation ... are fully constrained by the Constitution's protections
for individuals in article I, § 9, and the Bill of Rights"). Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 22328. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d
1192, 1201 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd inpart, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YouNG, supra note 19, at 4-5, 8; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 180 ("A court order
...is a 'law' to whose faithful execution the President is exhorted to attend"); cases cited in
note 24 supra & note 151 infra..
On the congressional power to compel certain types of testimony from "all federal officials," including the President's National Security Adviser, where otherwise there is a congressional "right to know," see Franck, The ConstitutionalandLegalPosition ofthe National
Security Adviser and Deputy Adviser, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 634, 637-39 (1980). Professor
Franck adds correctly that even the President has no "blanket immunity" from testifying
before Congress on national security matters, although "executive privilege may shield an
official from answering some ... questions." Id. at 638.
90. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 24 & 66 supra.
91. See, e.g., United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30, 31-5, 37-8 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692). With regard to lower level federal officials,
see also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ordering of "ministerial," as opposed to "discretionary," acts 92 when
more prohibitive remedies and money damages do not suffice; and the
subpoena power. 93 Whatever remedy is effective may vary with the

circumstances, but it is important to recall language in Marbury v.
Madison94 that intimates that whenever presidential violations of the

law have a sufficient impact upon an individual, the protection of the
individual's right to an effective remedy is also at stake."

Regarding the more specific question of secrecy concerning foreign
affairs or national security, one scholar has also suggested that the First

Amendment be interpreted to allow "the disclosure of plans that could

reasonably be believed to violate national or international law,"9 6 thus

92. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866) (President cannot be
enjoined from carrying into effect an Act of Congress); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'dinpart, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas.
1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16, 342) (President cannot "dispense with" execution of
an Act of Congress); G. GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 456,458 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)). See
also A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 107, 109, 121 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926); National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); J.
NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 4-5, 8; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 81,
at 50 (ministerial versus political discretionary duties); id. at 54 (political discretion ends
where law imposes a duty (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66
(1803))); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 81, at 64 (discretion must give way to demands of
law); id. at 67 (subjecting presidential "discretionary power to the limits of law").
93. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); G. GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 466-67; Berger, supra note 84, at 6 n.15, 19; Karst & Horowitz, supra
note 81, at 48-49, 67 (President not beyond the reach of the courts).
94. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. Id. at 162-63, 166. See also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1212 (D.C. Cir.
1979), aff'dinpart,452 U.S. 713 (1981); text accompanying notes 130-31 infra. On the legal
requirement to provide an effective judicial remedy for a violation of human rights, see
Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention, supra note 60, at 70 n. 13. See also Paust, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 243 n.79 (1981) [hereinafter Paust, Book Review], and cases
cited therein.
96. Futterman, ControllingSecrecy in ForeignAffairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 52, at 41. See also id at 16 (United States v.
Reynolds and United States v. Nixon do not bar court inspection of national security information "in an appropriate case"); id. at 48-50 (compelled disclosure categories). On this last
point, see L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 212. Futterman also argues, "The public would seem
entitled to know whether the CIA uses kidnapping or torture, or intercepts vast numbers of
telephone messages abroad." Futterman, supra, at 49. On the illegality of kidnapping and
torture by federal agents acting abroad, see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974).
For support of the general notion that disclosure should occur when law must be
served, see Berger, supra note 84, at 17 (early English history); id. at 27 (the Nixon affair);
Karst & Horowitz, supra note 81, at 64-65 (demands of law override presidential discretion);
id. at 67 (subjecting presidential "discretionary power to the limits of law"). See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 208 (privilege overcome by showing of relevancy to pending criminal
trial); Henkin, Executive Privilege.- Mr. Nixon Loses but the PresidencyLargely Prevails, 22
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subjecting the President to possible politico-legal controls with regard
to plans to engage in future illegal activity. Such controls include the
"ultimate remedy" of impeachment 97 and, of course, the voting power
of individuals and their congressional representatives.
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 40, 41-42 (1974) (the privilege will defer at least to the needs of criminal
justice and give way in every case to the public interest in law enforcement generally); Karst
& Horowitz, supra note 81, at 54 (discretion ends where law imposes a duty). Cf.Dorsen &
Shattuck, supra note 5, at 11, 32-33 (President cannot shield criminal wrongdoing or withhold information concerning criminal conduct (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
629 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1973))); Freund, Foreword- On
PresidentialPrivilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 21 (1974) ("the privilege would not extend to
communications in furtherance of a course of criminal conduct"); Henkin, supra, at 44-45
(not told how to weigh national security interests-thus, national security interests not an
automatic bar to disclosure of information); Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination,
and the Separation of Powers Illusion, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 92, 103-04, 115 (1974) (suggesting that "a constitutional purpose to inhibit abuse of executive power" overrides an executive privilege "when executive wrongdoing [or unlawful activity] is the object of
inquiry," because "evidence of such abuse is likely to be focused in executive communications;" "'[p]ersonal involvement' of the President obviously thwarts objective execution of
laws"); id. at 104 (unless impairment of national security is claimed, no weighing of interests
at stake should be made-thus, presumably national security interests should not be an automatic bar, but should be weighed); Van Alstyne, A Politicaland ConstitutionalReview of
United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 116, 127 (1974) (compulsory process regarding
presidential criminality); id. at 133 (court might safeguard judicial power from abuse even
by the President). See also Freund, supra, at 30-31.
This problem (ie., disclosure of presidential illegalities) was probably of concern to the
Court in UnitedStates v. Nixon. See Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 5, at 9 (Nixon brief);
Mishkin, supra note 81, at 76-78, 84 (any crimes and charges against any person). See also
L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 209.
Once prosecution has actually begun, however, matters contained in "investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes" might be held to be exempt from public disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 b(7) (1976). See Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Nevertheless, this exemption must not be
abused in an attempt to cover up illegalities and avoid actual prosecution. The statutory
exemption relates only to files compiled "for law enforcement purposes" and must be
squared with overriding constitutional policies and interests at stake. But see id. with regard
to completed investigations. The decision in the Aspin case was changed partly by subsequent amendment to the Freedom of Information Act. See Rubin, A Wholesome Discretion,
20 N.Y.L.F. 569, 596-97 (1975).
There is language from one federal district court opinion that seems to stand in sole
opposition to the many authorities noted above. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 455 F.
Supp. 921, 924 (D.D.C. 1978), in which the court, responding to a claim that information
should "be disclosed and denied the protection of [5 U.S.C. § 552 b(7)(C)] because the surveillance conducted by the FBI was illegal and therefore not law enforcement," concluded:
"Illegality or legality does not determine the applicability of this exemption." Absolutely no
reasoning or cases supported the conclusion, and in view of the authorities noted above and
the overriding constitutional policies at stake, such a conclusion is not constitutionally
justifiable.
97. See, e.g., J.BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
381 (1975); L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 215; Dean, supra note 81, at 379. But cf A. MILLER,
supra note 3, at 291-306. On impeachment, see E. BARRETr & W. COHEN, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW 461-63 (6th ed. 1981).
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Although disclosure of secret improprieties of a related sort was

not based on the First Amendment as such, the concurrent thrust of the
Congressional Committee's Articles of Impeachment and the Court's
opinion in United States v. Nixon 98 was certainly toward a forced dis-

closure of prior planning that could reasonably be believed to violate
national law. There are also several other general policies at stake in

such a case. As the Court recognized:
The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would [first] cut deeply
into the guarantee of due process of law and [second] gravely
impair the basic function of the courts. . . [third] [w]ithout access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally
frustrated.99
Since many of these policies are equally at stake when the President

violates the law and is subject to prosecution, presidential plans to enbe violative of national or international law
gage in conduct that would
°°
should be disclosed.1
Also of import when a President seeks to violate a law are threats
to our constitutional government, the public trust held by the President,

and the democratic society in which we are all participants. These
threats were most notably articulated in President Nixon's Articles of
Impeachment.'0 The House Judiciary Committee declared that Nixon
had violated his constitutional oath and his constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed by preventing, obstructing, and
impeding criminal investigations; 0 2 by repeatedly engaging in conduct
violating the constitutional rights of citizens; 0 3 by failing to act when
close subordinates were being investigated; 0" by knowingly misusing
98. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
99. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974). See also id. at 708-09. With
regard to the first and second policies noted in the text, see United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692d).
100. See also authorities cited in note 96 supra; President Reagan's executive order, Exec.
Order No. 12356, 45 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982), the Heritage Foundation's recommended legislation, 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP., at 2-3
(Dec. 1980).
101. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD NIXON, I-III,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),reprintedinN.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1974, at
E2 [hereinafter cited as ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT]; G. GUNTHER, supra note 69, at 45255.
102. ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT, supra note 101, at art. I. An early opinion of the Attorney General had already recognized that the Constitution requires the President to see
that lower federal officials "do their duty faithfully; and on their failure, to cause them to be
displaced, prosecuted, or impeached, according to the nature of the case." 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
624, 625 (1823). See also note 108 infra.
103. ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT, supra note 101, at art. II, preamble, §§ 1-3.
104. Id. at art. II, § 4.
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and by wilfully dis-

6

obeying subpoenas.
The Committee found such violations to be
"subversive of constitutional government," "contrary to his trust as
President," prejudicial to "the cause of law and justice," and "manifestly injurious to the people of the United States."'0 7

At another time, the American people denounced the King of England as a tyrant who was "unfit to be the ruler of a free People" be-

cause, among other things, he obstructed the administration of justice,
invaded "the rights of the people," protected violators of the criminal
law from punishment, and deprived people "in many cases, of the ben-

efits of Trial by Jury."'' 10 With these improprieties in mind, the Framers of the Declaration of Independence expressly declared that

governments are constituted "to secure" the inalienable Rights of Man,
that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-

erned," and that "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish" any
form of government that "becomes destructive of those ends." 0 9 What
the Framers recognized was that sovereignty" 0 and authority" exist
105. Id. at art. II, § 5.
106. Id. at art. III.
107. Id. at arts. I-III.
108. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). See also Declaration of the Causes
and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775). The specific improprieties listed are quite similar
to those listed by the House Judiciary Committee almost 200 years later. Compare the
above with text accompanying notes 102-05 supra. For a related point about the "evils" of
unlimited power described in the Declaration of Independence and their relevance to the
impropriety of Executive claims to exclusive or unlimited power, see Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.,) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
109. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). See also relevant language from
early state constitutions in Kurland, Government by Judiciary,2 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
307, 311-12 (1979); Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32, at 241 & n.30, 243-44 & nn.36-37;
Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 622. See generally United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 208-09, 219-21 (1882); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454, 460-63 (1793).
110. See, e.g., Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 622, and cases cited therein;
Paust, The Concept ofNorm, supra note 23, at 275 n.199. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 201 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372
(1882) (government "is one of delegated powers only, and... its authority is defined and
limited by the Constitution"); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208-09, 219-21 (1882);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454, 460-63 (1793); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606
F.2d 1192, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'dinpart, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The concept of a sovereign government is repugnant to those who share democratic
values. As Woodrow Wilson recognized, "There was never any sovereign government in
America."

W.

WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 146

(1908). See also Dean, supra note 81, at 378. For evidence of a contrary view--one which is
clearly incorrect in light of the cases and other evidences of traditional expectation noted
herein--see Baldwin, Absolute Power, an American Institution, 7 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1897) ("a
King who... rules in his own right"). What is curious is the fact that the concept of
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with the people, that the "authority of the people" is "the only author"sovereign immunity" ever arose to grant, in effect, an immunity from private suit for certain official wrongs. See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1926); James, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 610, 611-15 (1955).
Since the government is not sovereign, how can it rightly benefit from the concept of
sovereign immunity? We have recently begun to abandon the concept, but it lingers in certain circumstances. For example, the sovereign immunity of the federal government announced by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12
(1821), was first eroded by statutory consent to be sued and then by case decision. On statutory consent, see, e.g., the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976); the
Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1976). The Federal Torts Claims Act, however,
contains a number of exceptions, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h), (j) (1976). See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 970-75 (4th ed. 1971). For relevant
case decisions, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849);
Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (Jaffee III), vacating 48 U.S.L.W. 2586
(3d Cir. 1980) (Jaffee II) (slip. op.); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert.
cases cited in notes 88 & 95 supra, notes 130-31 infra;
denied, 411 U.S. 961 (1979) (Jaffee I);
Comment, Immunity of FederalExecutive Officials to Damage Suitsfor ConstitutionalViolations, 19 Hous. L. REv. 299 (1982).
In other related developments, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted so as to
find a waiver of immunity in certain state actions, when the state wilfully engages in federally regulated activities and Congress, expressly, or by clear implication, intends to abrogate
the state's immunity. Compare Parden v. Terminal R.R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), with Edeiman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651,672-74 (1974). See also E. BARRETr & W. COHEN, supra note 97, at 77-79. Private
suits against the state are also permitted where Congress has acted pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and has allowed them. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 44952 (1976). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNO, supra note 19, at 48-53; L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 129-47. For evidence of a related cutback in state immunity, now
termed a "qualified" immunity, see Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). With regard to cutbacks to a "qualified" immunity for
state judges, prosecutors, and sheriffs, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (sheriff);
Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1981) (judges, prosecutors, and sheriffs); Rankin v.
Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981) (judge); Hampton
v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'don othergrounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (prosecutor); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor); Jacobson v. Rose,
592 F.2d 515, 524 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979) (prosecutor); Briggs v.
Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978) (prosecutor); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978) (judge); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (prosecutor); Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine fJudicialImpunity,64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978).
For a description of the trends, see Jaffee v. United States 592 F.2d 712 (3d. Cir. 1979)
(Jaffee I). Similar cutbacks have occurred with regard to so-called municipal immunity.
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't., 600 F.2d 53
(6th Cir. 1979). The latter cutbacks have also occurred through state court and legislative
action, see, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra, at 984-87. Trends that were out-of-line with those
noted above concerned immunity granted from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to private
individuals whose alleged conduct included that of judicial coparticipants, who could then,
at least, claim immunity for themselves. See, e.g., Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d 172 (6th Cir.
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ity on which government has a right to exist in any country,"' 12 and
that all persons (including the President) are bound by the law." 3
Thus, it is evident that when the President of the United States violates
the law, he violates not only his constitutional oath and duty, but also
the expectations of the Framers-still generally shared-about authority, delegated powers, and democratic government.' 14 When the Presi1977); Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976). This view was not unanimous among the
circuits. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted
sub noma. Dennis v. Sparks, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y
Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court finally resolved the issue
by denying immunity to private coconspirators. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-32
(1980). For a useful discussion of derivative immunity, see Note, The Abrogation ofDerivative Immunity, 17 Hous. L. REv. 399 (1980).
On the broader question of immunity, I believe Justice Frankfurter correctly asserted
that whatever the ancient basis for a choice of immunity, "it undoubtedly runs counter to
modem democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State." Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Exparte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 150-60 (1908); Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States, 285 F.2d 766, 769 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
Also of importance is the fact that the United States now denies foreign governments any
"sovereign immunity" in our courts for violations of international law. See, e.g., Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980); Paust, The Mexican OilSpill,supra
note 39. The United States has also recognized that foreign heads of state are not entitled to
immunity in our courts for violations of foreign law. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); see also Nippon Hodo Co. v.
United States, 285 F.2d 766, 769 (Ct. Cl. 1961). It seems only a matter of time before any
lingering immunity will cease to restrain a full implementation of law.
111. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796) ("It is the declared will of the
people of the United States. . . and their will alone is to decide .... "); note 110 supra;
Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32, at 241-44, 252. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dal.) at 236.
112. See Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32, at 242 (quoting Thomas Paine). See also
cases cited in note 62 supra.
113. Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32, at 241-44. See the early opinions of the Attorneys General cited in note 79 supra, and the early judicial decisions cited in note 24 supra.
114. See generally Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32; Paust, The Concept ofNorm,
supra note 23; cases cited in note 62 supra. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (A. Hamilton)
("[e]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it
is exercised, is void"); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 81, at 47, 53-54, 64 (generally shared
expectation that "government under law" is required, and thus the presidential power is
limited by and not "above the law"); cases cited in notes 24 & 62 supra.
Early opinions of the Attorneys General also affirm the expectation of the Founders
that the "President possesses no powers but those which he derives from the constitution and
laws of the United States." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 406-07 (1820). See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 57071 (1822); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 521 (1821); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 229, 230 (1818); 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 213, 214 (1818). Thus, the President possesses no inherent or "emergency" powers
beyond those delegated by supreme federal law. See also 2 0p. Att'y Gen. 452 (1831); 2 Op.
Att'y Gen. 263 (1829); J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 270 (2d ed. 1982), (citing Winterton, The Concept ofExtra-ConstitutionalExecutive
Power in DomesticAffairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1979)); notes 137-44 and accompanying text infra. As stated also with regard to the powers of the Attorney General, "in a government purely of laws, no officer should be permitted to stretch his authority and carry the
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dent violates the law, he acts without authority, beyond his

constitutionally prescribed powers, and, quite likely, in a way destructive of democratic values." 5 As the House Judiciary Committee found,

such violations are "subversive of constitutional government.""' 6
In view of the above discussion, it is relatively easy to support
what some might term an "exception" to a claimed executive privilege

to withhold information when the President (or a subordinate) has engaged (or is likely to engage) in any violation of the Constitution or
other supreme federal law.1 7 Actually, this stems not from an exception to a "privilege," but from a limitation upon all forms of executive
power. Indeed, the limitation stems from the constitutional fact that
when a President violates the supreme law of the land, he acts without

authority and beyond his constituted powers. Because of this, clearly
one area in which the public must have an effective right to know, is
where violations of the law are involved. This is true whether that
right, born in revolution and a significant affirmation of democratic
values, is thought to be based on necessary penumbral guarantees of
the First Amendment or, more generally, on the nature of constitu-

tional authority and constituted powers as mirrored partly in the preamble to the Constitution, in article II duties, in article VI, clause 2,
and in the history and significance of the Ninth and Tenth

Amiendments. II
As the Founders must surely have understood, governmental secrecy about illegality thwarts both constitutional authority and democratic values. 119 In the Federalist Papers, for example, Hamilton
recognized that "the censure attendant on bad measures" deprives the

public
influence of his office beyond the circle which the positive law of the land has drawn around
... Op.
O Att'y Gen. 492, 493 (1821). See also 1
him. This... is republican orthodoxy.
Op. Att'y Gen. 211, 211-12 (1818); text accompanying notes 132-44 infra.
115. See generally Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32.
116. See ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT, supra note 101.
117. See, e.g., note 96 supra;text accompanying note 100 supra.
118. On that latter basis, see generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 70, 77 (A. Hamilton);
Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32; Paust, The Concept of Norm, supra note 23; cases cited
in note 62 supra.
119. Thomas Paine, for example, was an ardent patriot of the public's "right to know,"
declaring more specifically "There is no place for mystery... In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government, and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand." T. PAINE, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN pt. II, ch. III, at 179 (1961). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 719, 724 (1971) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:719

of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion,
.. . and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility
and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order
either to their removal from120office, or to their actual punishment
in cases which admit of it.
Hamilton was not adverse to secrecy, 12 1 but he recognized that secrecy
for the purpose of covering up "bad measures," "misconduct," and ille-

galities would obviously be detrimental to democratic values and to our
constitutional principles of delegated authority and powers. As he ex-

plained, such "abuse[s] of the executive authority" are threats to "public security,"' 122 and thus to national security as properly conceived." z
Furthermore, the Founders certainly were opposed, in Hamilton's
words, to "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, [which] have been,
in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." 124 125
What was even more alarming was the practice of secret confinement, a practice to be remedied by habeas corpus and clearly not
denied by restrictive interpretations of the First and Fifth Amendments

that rest on executive claims of "national security."
IH. Predominant Trends in Judicial Decision
In the 1950's, Justice Jackson warned, "Security is like liberty in

that many are the crimes committed in its name."' 26 He did not mean,
of course, that such a practice is legally proper; he meant to condemn
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
121. Id. No. 75 (secrecy regarding treaty negotiations).
122. Id. No. 77.
123. Justice Black would remind that secrecy at the expense of representative government provides no real security. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719
(1971) (Black, J., concurring). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (opinion of Hughes, C.J.)- Halperin v. Kissinger,
606 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd inpart, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). In New York Times
Co., Justice Douglas added: "Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic."
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton is, unfortunately, still correct
today. See, e.g., Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 631-62; see also M. McDouoAL,
H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 690-712 (1980).
125. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (quoting Blackstone).
126. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("In the name of security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on
evidence that is secret, because security might be prejudiced if it were brought to light in
hearings.") Justice Jackson was, unfortunately, correct. See materials cited in note 124
supra. For judicial recognition of the inherent vagueness of, and, thus, the dangers posed
by, a "security" concept, see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320
(1972); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,453 U.S. 928
(1981).
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criminal activity engaged in under a claim of "security." A year later,
he wrote that in order to preserve a "free government.

. .

the Execu-

tive [must] be under the law."' 27 He added that the power delegated to
the President to execute law "must be matched against words of the
Fifth Amendment .

. .

. One gives a governmental authority that

reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther."' 28 Even before Justice Jackson's warning, predominant trends in judicial decision had either confirmed or
conditioned related expectations about authority, delegated powers,
and the requirement that all persons, even the President, must obey the
supreme law of the land.
Perhaps the most articulate of these judicial expressions was made
in United States v. Lee, 2 9 in which the Supreme Court emphatically
stated that merely because one "asserts authority from the executive
branch" and "the President has ordered" a particular outcome of
events, the judiciary cannot deny a remedy to private litigants who
were harmed by the executive action. 30 Further, it was of no consequence, when constitutional rights were at stake, that the federal actors
were "military officers, acting under the orders of the President," during the Civil War and in supposed compliance with an act of Congress.' 3 ' As the Court declared more generally:
127. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Professor Berger adds that in 1791, Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court stated
"[T]he most powerful magistrates should be amenable to the law ....
No one should be
secure while he violates the Constitution and the laws." See Berger, supra note 81.
128. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646. In Youngstown, even the government attorneys argued that executive powers are "derived from the Constitution and they are limited, of
course, by the provisions of the Constitution." L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS,
POWER AND POLICY 40 (1972).
129. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
130. Id. at 219-21. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485 (1978); Wilkes v.
Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.),
cert.denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (Jaffee I); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355,
1359 (D. Hawaii 1977); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806)
(No. 16,342).
131. 106 U.S. at 219-21. Several other cases either have refused to enforce unconstitutional or unlawful presidential orders or have voided actions taken under such orders. See,
e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential order reversed); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-02 (1900) (voiding an executive seizure of
an enemy vessel in time of war); The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (presidential
orders to military officers in time of war cannot "legalize" illegal actions taken abroad);
cases cited in notes 24 supra & 139 infra. As those cases demonstrate, it does not matter
whether the actions taken or to be taken occur here or abroad, in time of war or of relative
peace. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No.
78-OOIA (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980); Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862)
(President "is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," including laws of
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No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All
the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.
It is the only supreme power in our system of government,
and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives.132
The President's power may have been near its zenith in time of war,
and even supported by an act of Congress, but both the Executive and
Congress are bound by the Constitution. As the Court explained in
United States v. Lee, law limits the exercise of delegated authority;
there is no authority to violate the law. As the Court declared seventyfive years later, the United States is "entirely a creature of the Constitution. . . . Its power and authority have no other source. It can only
act [at home or abroad] in accordance with all the limitations imposed
by the Constitution. . . . [It] has no power except that granted by the
Constitution ..
1,33 It was certainly not determinative, nor seemingly relevant, that foreign affairs, military interests, the concurrence of
Congress (through legislation) with the Executive, and even a treaty
were involved, for, as the Court explained, "[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch
of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
34
Constitution."1
war); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d
712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (Jaffee I).
132. 106 U.S. at 220. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), in which the
Court stated, "Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals,
whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law." Id. at 506 (citing United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220).
The district court in Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Hawaii
1977), added, "If this country has learned nothing else in the past decade, it has learned that
no man, nor any man acting on behalf of our government, is above the law." See also
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'dinpart,452 U.S. 713 (1981)
(citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220; United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16, 432)); note 114 supra.
133. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 12 (1957). See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Seery v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (CL
Cl. 1953) (Fifth Amendment applies abroad to taking of property by military in war area);
United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-OOIA (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted
in 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980); notes 109-10 & 114 supra. As these cases demonstrate, this is true
whether or not the government acts at home or abroad.
134. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 16. The quoted language constitutes "[t]he definitive
pronouncement on this constitutional question." See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG,

supra note 19, at 184 (citing several other cases).
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Even the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. , 3-which is cited incorrectly by some for the broad proposition
that executive power in the area of foreign affairs must prevail even

against law, actually recognized and reaffirmed the fundamental constitutional precept that "every... governmental power, must be exer-

cised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution."''

36

The Supreme Court has often stressed that even in

time of war, when executive powers are greatest, the President is bound
by the United States Constitution and by international law.137 Similarly, lower federal courts have recognized during a wartime context
that:
The executive department of our government cannot exceed the
powers granted to it by the Constitution and the Congress, and if
it'does exercise a power not granted to it, or attempts to exercise a
power in a manner not authorized38by statutory enactment, such
executive act is of no legal effect.'
Clearly, the same approach applies whether the Executive seeks to act

illegally in time of war or because of some putative "foreign affairs" or
135. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
136. Id. at 320 (a case which involved congressionally delegated power despite overly
broad dicta about the executive branch). This language was recently cited with approval in
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). See also id.
at 691 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The extraordinary powers of
the President and Congress ... cannot ... displace the Just Compensation Clause of the
Constitution.") Importantly, the majority opinion in Dames & Moore stressed that the President's actions in settling claims against Iran did not even attempt "to divest the federal
courts ofjurisdiction" in violation of article III of the Constitution. See id. at 685. A similar
recognition made only three days earlier was just as emphatic on this point. See Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 n.17 (1981) (Burger, C.J., opinion) (quoting United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)) (even an "exclusive power of the President. . . in the field of international relations [is] 'a power. . . which.. . of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.' ") See also Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 449, 451-52
(1952); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33
(Supp. 1982).
137. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra. In a nonwar context, it was also early recognized that the President has a duty to enforce and to obey "not merely the constitution,
statutes, and treaties of the United States, but those general laws of nations," all of which are
part of the supreme law of this country. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822).
1945). See also
138. Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp. 587, 593 (S.D. Ill.
Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849) ("while the chief agent of the government.. . is to be protected under mere errors ofjudgment in the discharge of his duties, yet
he is not to be shielded from responsibility if he acts out of his authority or jurisdiction");
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8Cranch) 110, 147, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting);
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) ('The President of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still
less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids"); authorities cited in note 89
supra.
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"national security" need that does not reach the level of a wartime crisis circumstance. 13 9 As the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
added in Zweibon v. Mitchell:4 "A plethora of other cases have simi-

larly recognized constitutional limits on the President's powers as commander-in-chief or as the nation's spokesman in the arena of foreign
affairs. The Supreme Court has indicated that 'even the war power
does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liber-

ties.' ",141 Thus, the exercise of war or foreign affairs powers not only
must be within the limits of the law, but also must not take exception to
law in the name of "necessity" or under some theory that claims the
end justifies the means.' 42 To this sort of claim, the Supreme Court

gave an apt reply in ExparteMilligan:43
Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors .... Those
great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise,
139. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); United
States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974); cases cited in notes 24, 127-28, 132
supra;authorities cited in note 89 supra. See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79
(1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267,
276-79 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Shapiro v. Ferrandina,
478 F.2d 894, 906 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973) (courts should see "that the Executive lives up to our
international obligations")); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603 (maj.), 611 (Seitz,
C.J., concurring and dissenting), 631 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nont
Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 518 F.
Supp. 69, 86, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on othergrounds, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981);
Here, it should also be noted that the circuit court in Haperinv. Kissinger came dangerously close to suggesting that when a "national security" crisis poses an "immediate and
grave peril to the nation," the judiciary might recognize "whatever special powers the Executive may hold in national security situations." 606 F.2d at 1201. Such a statement, however, begs the question of "whatever special powers the Executive may hold"-a question
answered in several previous cases to the effect that the President cannot lawfully exercise a
power that does not exist under the Constitution and, moreover, cannot exercise any power,
in any circumstance, so as to violate the supreme law of the land. See, e.g., cases cited in
notes 132-38 supra & notes 141-45 infra. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 164-67, 169-71;
Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention,supra note 60; Paust, The UnconstitutionalDetention of
Prisoners,supra note 61. It is also important that Hapern v. Kissinger never suggested that
the President can violate the supreme law of the land, but reaffirmed instead that the President is not immune from judicial process and must obey the law. See 606 F.2d at 1211,
1213.
140. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
141. 516 F.2d at 626-27 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934)). Home Building & Loan was quoted similarly in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 264 (1967), and in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
142. See generally cases cited in notes 24 & 62 supra and note 144 infra, especially Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Brown v. United
States, 12 U.S. (8Cranch) 110 (1815). See also Judge Stem's admonition concerning matters
of "interest" or "importance" to the state, at text accompanying note 33 supra.
143. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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when rulers and people would become restive under restraint,
and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends
deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional
liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law
... . The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under
all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
,povernment. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for
the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence
144

144. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952), Justice Jackson pointed out in his concurring opinion that the
Founders omitted presidential "powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency" and that they
knew how emergency powers "afford a ready pretext for usurpation." See also id. at 646
(under his "military role" the President cannot take action "without support of law, to seize
persons or property because they are important"). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube, despite
executive claims of a "grave emergency," "national emergency," "threats against our national security," jeopardy and peril to our "national defense," danger to national well-being
and safety, and the necessity of a presidential action to avoid a "national catastrophe," see
id at 582-84, 589-90, Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, and Clark agreed with
Justice Jackson (for various reasons) that the President has no inherent power outside of the
Constitution to meet such alleged needs, especially in the face of congressional powers to
deal with such emergencies. See id. at 587-89 (Black, J.), id. at 597, 602-04, 610, 614 (Frankfurter, J.); id. at 629, 633 (Douglas, J.); id. at 655, 659-60 (Burton, J.); id. at 660-62 (Clark,
J.). Neither did the dissent argue that the President could violate the law in any such circumstance. Id. at 691 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (quoting an older government brief about
exercising power "in ways short of making laws or disobeying them"). See also Yoshida
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1175 (Cust. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 560, 57883 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Massachusetts v. Simon, No. 75-1281 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1975), reprintedin
partin H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 124, 125 (2d ed. 1976)
("Neither the term 'national security' nor 'emergency' is a talisman. . . which should, #7so
facto, suspend the normal checks and balances on each branch of Government. Our laws
were not established merely to be followed only when times are tranquil"). Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (Black, J., opinion) ("in both good times and
bad"); notes 18 & 141 supra. The court in Simon also observed that the President is limited
by the Constitution and the law. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra, at 125-26.
On the pernicious ends and means theory, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Id. at 485. Of a related interest, but slightly different, is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
It is also worth noting that the excuse of claimed necessity for violations of international
law was expressly repudiated at Nuremberg. See, e.g., United States v. List, reprintedin 11
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 757, 1255
(1950); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
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. is controlled

by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute...
the laws," '45 adding, "By the protection of the law human rights are
secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked
rulers . ... "I'
Whether one is concerned with human rights, other constitution-

ally protected rights, or more ordinary federal law, it is beyond doubt
that whatever discretion the President may have concerning the implementation of law while exercising his duty faithfully to execute the law,
the President can never lawfully violate the law. 4 7 Although several

cases address the point that law limits any discretion the President
might otherwise have and that violations of the law are precisely those
48
aspects of circumstance that justify and demand judicial attention,
REv. 99, 159-61 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Paust, My Lai and Vietnam], and authorities
cited therein.
145. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
146. 1d. at 119. On the need for the judiciary to protect human rights, see Paust, International Law, supra note 3; Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32; Paust, Book Review, supra
note 95.

147. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 136 (D.D.C.), stay granted,513 F.2d
430, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659
(4th Cir. 1953), af'd on othergrounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (citing Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (duty not to go beyond the laws)); Cruikshank v. United States, 431
F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("The Government should not have the 'discretion' to
commit illegal acts ... In this area, there should be no policy option. . . .[and] there is no
exception to this rule for the acts of the CIA"); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451
(D.D.C. 1952) ("[Tlhe executive department's discretion, although in a political matter, must
be exercised with regard to the constitutional rights of the citizens, who are the ultimate
source of all governmental authority"); id. at 452 (executive power does not include "any
absolute discretion which may encroach on the individual's constitutional rights," nor does
Congress have "power to confer such absolute discretion"); cases cited in note 24 supra;
authorities cited in notes 81-83 & 89 supra; notes 93-108 supra. It should be noted that
Justice Holmes' dissent in Myers v. United States was also quoted approvingly by Justice
Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952).
148. See note 147 supra; Paust,Letter, supra note 23, and cases cited therein; Paust, The
Concept of Norm, supra note 23; text accompanying note 153 infra. See also text accompanying notes 15-18 supra; note 39 supra. Of course, "law" provides judicially discoverable
and manageable standards, and its application by the judiciary involves not only the judiciary's "traditional role" but should not properly embarrass either the Executive or Congress,
or both. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J. concurring); id.
at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973)
(Burger, C.J., opinion); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972) (Burger, C.J., opinion);
cases cited at notes 18 & 24 supra; text accompanying note 153 infra. Although Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Goldwater contains potentially overly broad dicta, such
dicta is distinguishable. Justice Rehnquist referred merely to "the conduct of our country's
foreign relations" as such and not necessarily to international law (as opposed to policy
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two cases are worth highlighting with regard to the limits of military
discretion. In Brown v. United States,1 49 both the majority and dissent
agreed that, in the majority's words, while exercising presidential discretion the Executive "can pursue only the law as it is written." 5 ' The
dissent added: "He has a discretion vested in him, as to the manner
and extent; but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers, or
authorize proceedings, which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims."' 1 A related executive power of a state governor was considered in Sterling v. Constantin.'52 , In that case, the Court declared:
It does not follow from the fact that the Executive has this
range of discretion, deemed to be a necessary incident of his
power to suppress disorder, that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts,
otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive
fiat. The contrary is well established. "hat are the allowablelimits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particularcase, arejudicialquestions .... There is
no ground for the conclusion that military orders in the case of
insurrection153 have any higher sanction or confer any greater
immunity.
In addition to rejecting claims of executive immunity from law because of important interests, 54 ends and means,1 55 or necessity, 5 6 the
Court has rejected the claim that the Executive cannot be bound by his
own regulations (te., that which he has the power to create and to terjudgments and foreign relations generally) or violations of supreme federal law by the Executive. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehmquist, J.,
concurring).
149. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
150. Id. at 128-29 (Marshall, C.J., opinion).
151. Id. at 153 (Story, J., dissenting). See also id at 145, 147, 149 (where no legislative
limit, President is still
governed by the law of nations); cases cited in notes 24 & 144 supra.
For similar reasons, a foreign government has no "discretion" to violate international law
and, if it does, it is not entitled to any immunity before our courts. See Letelier v. Republic
of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,
673 (D.D.C. 1980); Paust, The Mexican Oil Spill,supra note 39; Paust, Book Review, supra
note 95, at 242 n.78.
152. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
153. Id. at 400-01 (emphasis added). See also notes 15-16, 18, 130-32 & 142-44 and
accompanying text supra. With regard to the fact of judicial review of military actions taken
under circumstances of claimed "necessity" during war, see United States v. Russell, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134-35 (1851);
cases cited in note 24 supra.
154. See text accompanying note 33 supra; note 144 supra.
155. See note 142 supra.
156. See notes 142, 144 & 153 supra.
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minate). 5 7 This latter claim was expressly rejected in United States v.

Nixon, the Court noting that "[s]o long as [a] regulation is extant it has
the force of law.

.

. [and] [s]o long as [it] remains in force the Execu-

tive Branch is bound by it.'

5

8

Other cases,' 5 9 as well as earlier text

60

writers on military law,1 agree with that holding.
IV.

Regulating the Intelligence Community

In light of the above discussion and case law, it is clear that the
FBI and the CIA, whether acting at home or abroad, are bound, like
61
the President, by the Constitution, and other supreme federal law.
For this reason, FBI or CIA charters adopted by Congress need no
clause demonstrating that these entities are bound by all of the supreme
federal law; that result is necessarily required as a matter of constitutional law. Nevertheless, a far more difficult problem was presented
recently by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. In
a speech before an American Bar Association Conference on Intelligence Legislation, Director Carlucci explained that intelligence organizations like the CIA "must go forward with our task, often in disregard
of foreign law."' 62 As he explained, foreign law might simply forbid
the collection of intelligence and the fact that a foreign agent has a
contract with the CIA may itself "break the law of the agent's host
country."' 6 3 He added, "The problem.

. .

is.

.

. how we sanction this

kind of activity within a carefully drawn legal framework .... [W]e
157. See cases cited in notes 158-60 infra. This sort of claim was also made by Professor
Henkin, supra note 48, in an effort to justify presidential violations of international law. See
note 54 supra. A similar claim, later rejected by the Supreme Court, was made by Professor
Bickel. See Bickel, Lawful Powers of the President, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1974, at 30, col. 5.
158. 418 U.S. 683, at 695-96 (1974) (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959)); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260 (1954).
159. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973); notes 158 supra & 160 infra.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 192.
160. See W. WINTHROP, supra note 81, at 32, in which the author states, "[The President, as well as any other executive official, would be so far bound by general regulations
framed by him that he could not justly except from their operation a particular case to which
they applied" (citing Arthur v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 422 (1880); l )Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 17
(1861)).
161. For cases involving those agencies, see United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'dinpart,452
U.S. 713 (1981); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977). See also notes
102 & 130-32 supra.
162. 2 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no. 8, at
7 (Aug. 1980).
163. Id.
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must always bear in mind that we are legalizing an activity that is inherently antagonistic to the interests of other countries in which that
activity is going to be conducted."'" Surely, Director Carlucci did not
have in mind assassination and torture directed by the United States,
which would violate not only United States law and foreign law, but
international law as well. 165 What he seemed concerned with is
whether or not the CIA should be free to violate foreign law as long as
our Constitution, federal laws, and international law are not violated.
Because neither article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution nor the case
law mention foreign law as such, this question is interesting. One approach might be to distinguish the types of foreign law involved. For
example, CIA violations of foreign laws that are similar to United
States laws might be prohibited. Thus, otherwise unregulated CIA activities abroad could be prohibited if those activities would have been
prohibited had they occurred, for example, in a United States territory
or against United States citizens. Another approach might be simply to
ignore violations of foreign law that do not also involve a violation of
international law, United States federal law, or the Constitution.
In a case involving solely a violation of foreign law, the same types
of legal policy might not be at stake. Although legitimate needs for
effective intelligence and national security do not outweigh the
supreme law of the land, they might still outweigh foreign law or certain types of foreign law. Certainly, the government cannot act abroad
except in accordance with the supreme law of the land, 166 but if the
164. Id.
165. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980) (prohibition of
assassination recognized in both national and international law); Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980); Kelly, Assassination in War Time, 30 MIL. L.
Rav. 101 (1965); Paust, MyLai and Vietnam, supra note 144, at 143-46; note 96 supra. Former Director of the CIA William Colby has stated that there should be an "absolute" prohibition against the assassination of foreign leaders (except in times of armed conflict) and a
flat prohibition of torture. LAW, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP,
supra note 10, at 174. Earlier, there were recommendations of the United States Senate
Select Intelligence Committee that the United States not engage in assassination under any
circumstances and that a criminal law be enacted making certain forms of assassination a
domestic criminal offense. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1023-26 (1981) (reproducing portions of the Committee's Report on Assassinations, S. Doc. No. 465, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-7, 257-77 (1975)).
166. Note that the CIA is thereby restrained by international law, and relevant international law would apply regardless of the nationality of persons involved. Because some
provisions of the federal Constitution may not apply to foreigners abroad, in a manner similar to Americans abroad and to both foreigners and Americans within the United States,
some foreigners may not receive the same protections as Americans, yet some foreigners
will. See, e.g., Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (occupied territory);
United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-0OIA (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted
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government's public acts abroad violate only a foreign law, are the government and its agents acting within the scope of their public power
entitled to immunity? Foreign government agents engaging in similar
activities within the United States might add another variable to the
inquiry. 167 Does this latter concern depend168upon whether or not foreign agent activities violate our own laws?
With regard to international law, if foreign law is violated on foreign territory (Ze., the territory of the "host" state) at the direction of
our government, international law might not necessarily be violated,
depending on the nature of the activity (e.g., the mere receipt of information within a country versus an active participation in its extraction
in 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980) (occupied territory). See also Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382, 1386-89 (10th Cir. 1981); Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
167. Foreign agents suspected of illegal activities in this country, including espionage,
have been held in detention. There are also practices of expelling such persons aspersona
non grata, "trading" them, or simply watching them. Concerning the latter, see the 1978
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. 111978). With regard
to personanon grata practice, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963,
art. 23(1), 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 9(1), 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. It should also be noted that
espionage is generally regarded under international law as a "political offense" for purposes
of extradition. See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of PoliticalOffenses: A Knotty Problem of
ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1237 (1962), reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 487 (13. Weston, R. Falk & A. D'Amato eds. 1980).
A problem also exists with regard to the constitutionality of potentially vague language
contained in our own espionage laws. Some language appears far too broad in the face of
human rights law and related constitutional standards, since some provisions might be interpreted so as to prohibit what is merely a knowing receipt of public "information relatingto
the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to
• . . the advantage of any foreign nation." 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 793(e) (1976) (emphasis
added). Again, this might involve the mere receipt of public information and be interpreted
so as to prohibit an activity deemed by this author to be generally permissible under human
rights law when engaged in by the CIA in a reverse situation. See text accompanying notes
174-82 infra. Either the statutes involved should be amended or they should be restricted by
judicial interpretation that implements human right standards as suggested below. For a
more general discussion of this statute and other potentially broad restrictions on the free
flow of information, see Rubin, supra note 96, at 577.
168. A former Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Leo
Cherne, has stated, "The KGB invades our civil privacy. ... Indeed, nothing the 'plumbers' ever contemplated was a fraction as extensive as the routine, daily violation by the
Soviet Union of the communications of U.S. individuals, companies and institutions." LAw,
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP, supra note 10, at 9. On Soviet activities, see also 3 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE REP. no.
6, at 5-6 (June 1981) (Czechoslovakian activities coordinated with KGB); Epstein, The Spy
War, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. With regard to "intelligence operations in the U.S., ranging from surveillance to assassination" conducted by Chile, Iran, the
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia, see ForeignSpooks, Houston Post, Nov.
9, 1980, (Parade Magazine) at 17, col. 2; Spies Among Us, TIME, Aug. 10, 1981, at 19, col. I
(Taiwan, Libya).
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from foreign government files). Does it matter that the activity is itself

arguably protected by international law-for example, as part of a process of a relatively free exchange of information across national
borders?

International law does prohibit many types of active and intentional interference with the essentially domestic or internal affairs of
another nation, 61 9 especially the undermining of a foreign self-determination process through strategies of military or economic coercion. 7 '
The extent of these prohibitions is complicated, however, by other com-

peting interests that might internationalize a situation so that foreign
"internal" affairs are no longer "essentially" domestic within the meaning of article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.' 7 ' Examples include

international concern about human right deprivations engaged in by a
foreign government against its own people 172 and the relatively recent
recognition of a right of self-determination assistance. 73 It is certainly
possible that intelligence agencies will participate in activities abroad
that involve permissible efforts to further human rights and self-deter169. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4 & 7; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res.
2625, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
170. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1961); J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972); J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, THE ARAB OIL WEAPON 70-79, 84-96, 122-23, 137-39, 153-56 (1977) (with relevant
U.N. documents reprinted at 310); Falk,An Alternative to Covert Intervention, 69 PROC., AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 195 (1975); Remarks of A. Fatouros, id. at 193; Remarks of T. Franck, id. at
214-15; Remarks of A. Rubin, id. at 210; Paust & B laustein, War CrimesJurisdictionandDue
Process.: The Bangladesh Experience, I1 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 18-19, 30-31 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes].
171. See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness
ofInternationalConcern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968); Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes, supra
note 170, at 10-19.
172. See, e.g., note 171 supra; R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 5, 37, 67, 134, 865-66 (1979); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note
124, at 89-90, 185, 208-15, and authorities cited therein. See also United States Brief, Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. 1980), reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 585 (May 1980), reviewed in more detailin Paust, Book Review, supra note 95; Paust, TransnationalFreedom of
Speech: Legal Aspects of the Helsinki FinalAct, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (1982)
[hereinafter Paust, TransnationalFreedom of Speech].
173. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes, supra note 170, at 11-12 n.39, 38; Paust,
Sef-Determinatiom A D fnitionalFocus, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL,
AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 3, 7 (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980). As the above
sources indicate, this might well involve assistance to a people who seek relief from oppression by their present government. Self-determination assistance may even take the form of
support for a democratic revolution, causing the overthrow of an oppressive foreign government by relatively peaceful or even violent means. Since such activity is permissible, even
desirable, under international law, it should matter little that decrees of the prior dictatorship are thereby "violated." Obviously, the main concern is whether or not self-determination is promoted.
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mination, whether or not such internationally permissible activities violate some foreign law. It must be assumed, therefore, that the mere fact
of a violation of foreign law is not determinative since adequate inquiry must extend to consideration of all relevant legal policies, including international and United 'States domestic law.
In addition, commentators generally agree that the mere receipt of
information from outside a nation's territorial jurisdiction, without
more, is generally permissible.174 What about the gathering of intelligence from within, or the dissemination of information, not to coerce,
but to inform a foreign populace so that they might themselves participate even more effectively in the shaping of their political process? Is
there something like a global First Amendment freedom-one that
even CIA agents can enjoy? In another article, I have documented the
fundamental human right to freedom of opinion and expression, which
international law affirms as including the freedom "to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."''7 5 Although such law has been challenged,17 6 United States
and foreign intelligence agents who merely gather and disseminate
174. See generally N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 302-03 (1973) (difference between receipt and sending of information); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965) (mere
receipt of information abroad must be "recognized as a crime under the law of states that
have reasonably developed legal systems"); HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
art. 7 (1935) (jurisdiction over security threatening conduct outside of state's territory, provided that such conduct is not a liberty guaranteed by the law of the place where it was
engaged in; note that mere receipt of information may very well be a human right where
engaged in); Almond, International Monitoring Agency: The French Proposal, 19 INT'L
PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK 22, 24 (Int'l L. Ass'n. July 1982); Remarks of R. Borosage, 69
PROC., AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (1975) ("[s]ome 85% of our information comes either from open
sources ... or from technological means, such as satellites or sonars. These modes of collection are generally considered to be legal under international law"). See also Remarks of
R. Borosage, id. at 192 (distinguishing between intelligence collection and covert action).
But see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 190-91,
285 (2d ed. 1981), and references cited therein; Paust, The Seizure and Recovery ofthe Mayaguez, supra note 54, at 785 n.58, 789-91 (additional facts of coastal state control measures in
their own territorial sea or on the high seas and, thus, not clearly on another state's territory). With regard to "electronic intelligence," see also Epstein, supra note 168; Casey, The
State ofIntelligence, 3 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT'L SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE
REP. no. 6, at 1 (June 1981). In our own domestic system, the mere gathering of intelligence
information by lawful means, without a demonstrated harm or threat of harm, has been
declared to be nonjusticiable and thus necessarily is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g.,
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) ("[Tlhere is nothing in our Nation's history or in this
Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any
indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities... would go
unnoticed or unremedied").
175. Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 625-31. See also Paust, Transnational
Freedom ofSpeech, supra note 172.
176. See Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 648-50.

Summer 19821

PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

public information "through any media and regardless of frontiers"
would seem to be exercising an internationally protectable human
right. They are engaged, to that extent, in an activity related to the
public's "right to know" and are not thwarting another human rightthe right to privacy.
Yet there are other complications. First, there is an exception to
such a freedom: one conditioned by a strict test of necessity within
democratic limits.'7 7 This exception, when properly implemented, al-

lows the foreign government to limit the human rights of a foreign
agent within its country.1 78 In the reverse situation, in which the
human rights of foreign agents who gather public information in this
country are involved, the test is also usable, as is any other part of
human rights law, by our federal courts; 17 9 it contains several limiting
provisions that seek to accommodate important interests, including the
"just requirements" and the "democratic society" phrase. Since the exception is strictly controlled and available only in a "democratic society," 180 the human right "to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas" should be available to United States agents in many countries
under many circumstances, regardless of violations of foreign laws that
seek to deny this human right and that do not comply with the test set
forth in human rights instruments for a lawful exception to such a
right. Again, the mere fact that a foreign law is violated should not
determine legality under international law or under the supreme federal law of the United States. A second complication arises when intelligence agents seek and receive information that is not otherwise
"public" in the "host" country. Then, at least, human rights norms
might bend to a foreign country's interest in a right to privacy' 8 ' and
foreign espionage laws. The question arises, should the United States
177. See id at 624, 626-29. Article 29, paragraph 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of.
Human Rights reads, "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29, para. 2 (1948).
178. This test, required by international law, seems compatible with the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 167. See also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
179. See, e.g., Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 665-70; Paust, Human Rights,
supra note 32,passim.
180. Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 626-29.
181. Since there is a human right to privacy, the foreign law violation may also involve a
violation of international law. In such a case, our intelligence agents should be restrained.
On the human right to privacy, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12 (1948);
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 124, at 466, 548-49, 810, 816-17, 82025, 840-56, and authorities cited therein. Concerning a related right to privacy in the United
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government authorize violations of foreign laws that are not themselves
overridden by international law, so long as the activity to be engaged in
by government agents would not itself constitute a violation of international law or other supreme federal law?182 Or, in such a circumstance,
should we authorize nothing so precise, leaving the matter for executive
decision and, realistically, leaving the agent who is caught to the foreign judicial system? The latter approach is the one presently operative, and for now there is no compelling need to change it where
supreme federal law is not at stake.
Nonetheless, three important legal restraints on government intelligence agents operating here or abroad have been identified. American agents must not violate: (1) the Constitution, (2) international law,
or (3) other supreme federal law. Also identified are three important
rights or freedoms based on international law that government agents
should be able to enjoy so long as they are not otherwise restricted by
supreme federal law: (1) the general freedom to further human rights,
(2) the general freedom to promote self-determination in accordance
with international law, and (3) the general human right to seek, receive,
and impart public information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. These last three rights or freedoms should be
available whether or not a foreign law is violated, unless international
law recognizes the validity of a foreign law restraining a human right
or freedom in accordance with the strict test of necessity within democratic limits. It has also been recognized that international law prohibits many forms of military or economic coercion, and that
assassination, torture, or violations of basic human rights must not be
allowed whether or not such conduct is compatible with foreign law.
Yet, whether or not foreign laws can or should otherwise be violated is
left for future consideration.
One final point involves judicial choice concerning limitations
placed on the public's "right to know" sensitive and secret intelligence
agency information. Although judicial tests are still being refined,
greater attention should be paid to the "necessity within democratic
States, see Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1199-1200, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'din
part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
182. Note that a violation of a foreigner's (or American's) human right to privacy would
be impermissible under article six, clause two of the Constitution, or through the process of
indirect incorporation, as explained in Paust, InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 666, 668-70,
but there is an exception to the right of privacy if one can meet the strict test of necessity
within democratic limits. See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note
124, at 807 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 29); id. at 810 (citing
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 30 & 32, and the European Convention on
Human Rights, article 8(2)).
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limits" test developed as a part of human rights law. As noted above,

the human rights test accommodates several important interests while
seeking to assure democratic values, and it is usable by the federal judiciary with or without further attempts at guidance through congres-

sional legislation. Nevertheless, no matter what test is finally adopted,
there should always be an overriding constitutional exception to governmental83secrecy when supreme federal law has been or is likely to be
violated.'
183. See notes 10, 96, 100 & 117-25 and accompanying text supra. An intriguing question also worth considering is whether or not foreign government illegalities committed in
the United States and known by our government should be revealed publicly. Is there a
public "right to know" about these also? For an interesting exchange between Dean Rusk
and Richard Falk on this issue, see PRoc., AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 214 (1975) (Rusk disfavoring
and Falk favoring disclosure). On balance, I tend to favor disclosure unless overriding national security interests can be demonstrated to a court. I would, therefore, favor a judicial
opportunity to make a choice on such a question. On foreign government illegalities, see
also note 168 supra.
On the preferable and ever-present need for judicial choice, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra
note 9, at 204-05, and cases cited therein; Cox, Watergate and the Constitution ofthe United
States, 26 U. TORoNTo L.L 125, 132-33 (1976); Freund, supra note 96, at 33-4; Goldberg,
supra note 81, at 712; Rubin, supra note 96, at 598 (Congress clearly intended that the judiciary "should have the final determination of what information should be withheld from public scrutiny on the grounds of national security"); id. at 600 (claims of executive privilege
have always been subject to judicial review) (citing Berger, Executive Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1044, 1288 (1965)). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 711 (1974) (suggesting a choice not to inspect in certain circumstances, Ze., when the
Executive can "satisfy the court" concerning a reasonable danger that in camera inspection
will lead to exposure of the information-an outcome that would seem in fact to occur only
rarely); Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 947-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1978) (in camera inspection at the
discretion of the court) (citing Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 696
(D.C. Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000, 1003
(7th Cir. 1977); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,
251 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for United States & Canada v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 458 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978); Aspin v. United States Dep't of Defense, 453 F. Supp. 520 (D.C. Wis. 1978); Fonda v. Central Intelligence Agency, 434 F.
Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1977). These trends in decision seem generally compatible with dicta
contained in the early case of United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 191 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,
692d). Even the majority in the Snepp decision spoke of "reasonable restrictions on employee activities" and of the fact that the CIA review procedure is itself "subject to judicial
review." Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3, 513 n.8 (1980). See also id. at 526
(Stevens, 3., dissenting).
It is also worth noting that the Freedom of Information Act, considered in some of the
cases noted above, allows judicial in camera inspection of certain records or recordings as
well as "such additional evidence as it deems necessary." 5 U.S.C. § 552b (h)(1) (1976).
This applies to determinations about the propriety of executive classifications of matters
sought "to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy" in accordance
with § 552b (c)(1), as recognized partly there ("in fact properly classified") and in subsection
(h)(1) ('jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of subsections (b) through (f)").
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Conclusion
In conclusion, it might be useful to recall the observation of a sagacious Englishman who, when confronted with the notion that the
King can do no wrong, reminded "that the King not only is capable of
doing wrong, but is more likely to do wrong than other men if he is
given a chance."' 84 Contrary to another old adage-that this is a government of laws and not of men-it seems wise to note that, realistically, we have a government of both. The trick is to make the second
attentive to the first.
Choices will be made by real human beings, human beings who
certainly can do wrong. Choices must be made about the content of
law, and delegated authority does allow a measure of discretion, but
one peremptory norm remains-all who exercise authority in the name
of the people of the United States, all within the government, as all
others living in our country, are bound by the supreme law of the land
in their exercise of choice. For this reason, they may never lawfully
violate such law.
If it were ever otherwise, then, functionally, as Judge Stern recognized implicitly in United States v. Tiede,8i 5 there would be no Constitution, no First Amendment. Recently, there have been claims made
that the President and others can violate the supreme law of the land.
Clearly, this and other disturbing notions of executive immunity from
law and judicial inquiry must be opposed. Whatever the boundaries of
discretion as such, the President must not step outside the law. Furthermore, this line between permissible discretion and law is one that
must be drawn by the judiciary-a line that must forever hold against
every attempted break and any claimed exception.
Postscript: the Reach of Fitzgerald
Justice White, writing in dissent, argued that the recent decision in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald'8 6 "places the President above the law,"' 87 adding:
'188
"It is a reversion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong."
184. A. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 292 (1935), quotedin Nippon Hodo Co. v. United

States, 285 F.2d 766, 769 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd inpart, 452 U.S.
713 (1981) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
185. Crim. Case No. 78-OO1A (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprintedin 19 LL.M.
179, 191 (1980).
186. 50 U.S.L.W. 4797 (U.S. June 24, 1982) (No. 79-1738). The decision in Fitzgerald
was handed down after this article was in pageproofs.
187. Id. at 4806 (White, J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 4815 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
188. Id. at 4806 (White, J.,dissenting).
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For Justice White, the Fitzgerald holding means that the President
now:
[M]ay, without liability, deliberately cause serious injury to any
number of citizens even though he knows his conduct violates a
statute or tramples on the constitutional rights of those who are
injured. ... He would be immune regardless of the damage he
inflicts, regardless of how violative of the statute and of the Constitution18he
knew his conduct to be, and regardless of his
9
purpose.
Nevertheless, Justice White recognized that the majority opinion in
Fitzgerald "is almost wholly a policy choice,.. . and.. . is ambiguous in its reach and import."' 190 He also recognized, in contrast to his
dire prediction about placing the President "above the law," that the

Fitzgerald holding leaves the President subject to the impeachment

sanction, 19 ' to criminal prosecution, 192 to suits seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief,193 and generally to judicial review and "judicial process."' 194 Moreover, he added quite appropriately: "Regardless of the

possibility of money damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of the President's actions or their legality under the applicable
statutes can and will be subject to review."' 195
These latter recognitions are, in my opinion, closer to the mark.
As Justice Powell observed while writing for the majority, the civil
damages immunity decision "will not place the President 'above the
law'. . . [but] merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged
misconduct." 196 Chief Justice Burger, concurring separately, seemed to
agree, while adding:
The dissents are wide of the mark to the extent that they imply
that the Court today recognizes sweeping immunity for a President for all acts. The Court does no such thing. The immunity is
limited to civil damage claims. Moreover, a President . . . [is]
189. Id. See also id. at 4807.
190. Id. at 4807. See also id. at 4813 ("ambiguity even with respect to the most fundamental point: How broad is the immunity granted the President?").
191. See id. at 4807 n.2, 4810. See also id. at 4804 (Powell, J., opinion).
192. Id. at 4810 (White, J., dissenting). See also id. at 4804 n.38 (Powell, J., opinion). On
this point, see also text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
193. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4810 (White, J., dissenting). On this point, see also text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
194. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4810 (White, J., dissenting). See also id. at 4805 (Burger, CJ., concurring). On this point, see also text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
195. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4810 (White, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 4804 (Powell, J., opinion). See also id. at n.41, where Justice Powell adds that
Justice White's fear of the Fitzgerald decision placing the President above the law is "wholly
unjustified," that the President "remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office,"
and that the case "involves only a damages remedy."

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9.719

not immune for acts outside official duties. 97

Thus, although the reach of Fitzgerald is partly ambiguous, and one
can appreciate Justice White's concern about the impact of the decision
on presidential obedience to supreme federal law, at least two points
are made clear: (1) no member of the Court claims that the President
can violate the law, and (2) no member of the Court claims that the
President is immune from sanctions other than civil damage remedies.
Also important is that every member of the Court would limit the cutback of civil damages relief at least to cases where the President was
acting within the scope of his constitutional authority. 9 As the Chief
Justice explicitly forewarned: "[Aibsolute immunity does not protect a
President for acts outside the Constitutional function of a President' 99
or "outside official duties. ' '2°°
For these reasons, Fitzgerald is "merely" a civil damages case,20 '
and the impact of Fitzgerald will hinge on subsequent use of the
"within the scope" concept-at least until a change occurs in the
Court's membership 20 2 or, as some members of the Court seem to intimate, Congress expressly creates "a damages action against the President of the United States. ' 20 3 For purposes of this article the main
question remaining is whether, contrary to some of the critical statements of Justice White, the majority of the justices recognize that when
197. Id. at 4804 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also id. at 4805 n.4, 4806; Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4822 n.5 (U.S. June 24, 1982) (No. 80-945) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4798, 4802 n.27-4804 (Powell, J.,
opinion), 4804-06 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4822
n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf.id.at 4821 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (would "reexamine
our holding in Butz v. Economou").
199. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4815,4822 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
200. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4804 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id.
at 4805 n.4, 4806 (acts must be "within the scope of Executive authority").
201. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4802 n.27 (decided only that President is
immune from civil damages liability for his official acts), 4804 ("merely precludes a particular private remedy") (Powell, J., opinion). See also id. at 4804, 4806 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
202. This is an obvious point for most, but it is underscored by Justice White's recognition that Fitzgerald "is almost wholly a policy choice," without adequate historical underpinning or express textual support. See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4807 (Justice White adding: "This is
policy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy"). See also id. at 4810 ("no support in
constitutional text or history, or in the explanations of the earliest commentators"); cf.id. at
4802 n.31 (Powell, J., opinion). Moreover, the notion of civil damages immunity has no
proven support in patterns of generally shared legal expectation in the United States.
203. See id. at 4802 n.27 (Powell, J., opinion); see also id. at 4815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger clearly disagrees with any notion that Congress can create presidential civil damages liability. See id. at 4806 n.7. On the legislative cutbacks of immunity
generally, see note 110 supra.
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a President violates supreme federal law he does not function "within

the scope of Executive authority," 2" "official acts,"2 5 "official duties, '2 0 6 or "the Constitutional function of a President."207 For reasons
noted below, I believe that each member of the Court either assumes or

affirms such a recognition.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger, in response to Justice White, has im-

plicitly declared that if a President knows, for example, that his conduct violates a statute, he is acting "outside the Constitutional function

of a President" and civil damages immunity will not be allowed.20 8
The Chief Justice also declared: "Far from placing a President above
the law, the Court's holding places a President on essentially the same

footing with judges and other officials whose absolute immunity we
have recognized." 2 9 Since judges and other officials are not immune

from actions based on knowing or reasonably foreseeable violations of
law because such violations are not within the scope of judicial or other
official functions,21 0 Chief Justice Burger's statements are consistent.
Moreover, the Chief Justice added that Fitzgerald does not preclude

inquiry, "in a given case,..

.

whether an official-even a President-

204. For use of this language, see id. at 4805-06 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id. at
4804 (Powell, J., opinion) (within his constitutional and statutory authority).
205. For use of this language, see id. at 4802 & n.27, 4803 (Powell, J., opinion), 4804 n.1,
4805 (Burger, C.L, concurring).
206. For use of this language, see id. at 4803 & n.32 (Powell, L, opinion), 4804, 4805 n.4
(Burger, CJ., concurring).
207. For use of this language, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4815,4822 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4804-05 &
n.3 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (does not prohibit sanctions against illegal acts since such are
outside scope of duties).
209. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4806 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id.
at 4804.
210. See, e.g., id. at 4806,4807 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (unlawful activity "does not fall
within the judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions to which absolute immunity attaches"); cases and materials cited in note 110 supra (especially Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d
1264, 1267-70 (9th Cir. 1981)); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489-91, 493-95, 498 (1978);
Comment, Immunity ofFederalExecutive Officials to DamageSuitsfor Constitutional Violations, 19 Hous. L. Rav. 299, 305, 319 (1982) (unconstitutional acts are not authorized and
not within the scope). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4818 (Powell, L,
opinion) (judges absolutely immune only when performing judicial function); United States
v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979) (no congressional immunity for illegal acts); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (judge and others not immune for illegal acts); Gravel v.
United Staztes, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972) (no official immunity for criminal conduct); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (same); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 698-99 (1949); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), quotedin text accompanying note 132 supra; Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849), quoted in note 138
supra; Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir. 1974) (no judicial immunity for act
of assault in courtroom).
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had acted within the scope of the official's constitutional and statutory
duties," and that "absolute immunity does not extend beyond such
actions." 2 1'
Whether or not the majority's characterization of the events was
correct, Justice Powell consistently stressed that the plaintiff's claim in
Fitzgerald actually rested on acts "well within" the scope of presidential authority. 21 2 Moreover, he added: "In defining the scope of an
official's absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere of
protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying
purposes."2' 13 Since Justice Powell identified these as including primarily the need to avoid "the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch,"'2 1 4 one can assume that Justice
Powell would agree with the Chief Justice that illegal conduct outside
the authority and the constitutional function of a president will not be
protected.21 5 Illegal conduct clearly is not "related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes," but is instead destructive of those purposes,
the more general legal policies at stake, 2 16 and-as recognized earlier
by the House Judiciary Committee-our form of constitutional government. 2 17 Further, as the above article demonstrates, when the President violates the supreme law of the land, he acts without authority and
beyond his constitutionally prescribed powers. 218
211. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4797,4805 n.4 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). See also id. at 4804.
212. Id. at 4804 (Powell, J., opinion) (clearly within President's authority, "well within
the outer perimeter of his authority"); see also id. at 4798 n.34 (actions within official capacity), 4802 (official acts), 4803 (within official duties). Justice Powell also noted the administrative finding below that Fitzgerald's allegation that he was fired in retaliation for his
testimony before a congressional committee was not supported by "the evidence in the record." See id. at 4799. Justice White clearly disagreed, and his assumption that President
Nixon had actually acted illegally in this instance seemed to form the basis for his assumption that the majority was approving immunity in the case of known illegal conduct. See,
e.g., id. at 4806 (White, J., dissenting); text accompanying notes 187-89 supra. Cf. 50
U.S.L.W. at 4812 (White, J., dissenting).
213. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4803.
214. Id.
215. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
216. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 76-83, 101-18, 128-53 supra.
217. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
218. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 76-83, 101-18, 128-53 supra. For this reason, a
separation or balance of powers inquiry would be misplaced when the President violates
supreme federal law, for the President has no power to violate the law. As the Chief Justice,
who generally favors a separation of powers rationale, must have recognized, when the President violates the law he acts "outside the Constitutional function of a President." See text
accompanying note 208 supra. Justice White would surely agree. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
50 U.S.L.W. at 4814 (White, J., dissenting).
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The dissenting justices quite clearly agree with these points. Indeed, the whole thrust of their argument is that not only should the
President be liable for civil damage remedies for illegal conduct engaged in outside the delegated authority of the President, but that he
should also be liable for any actionable injuries caused by conduct occuring within the scope of his powers. 21 9 As Justice White seemed to
summarize, "the President should have the same remedial obligations
22 0
toward those whom he injures as any other federal officer.
Justice White's statement, then, that the majority would allow the
President "deliberately [to] cause serious injury to any number of citizens even though he knows his conduct violates a statute or tramples on
the constitutional rights of those who are injured" 221 is misplaced and
possibly an overreaction. 2 2 If the President knew that his conduct was
violative of supreme federal law, he would be acting outside his constitutional authority, and, as the Chief Justice concurred, would not be
entitled to immunity. Thus, however appropriate the concern of Justice
White, the President is not "above the law" and cannot violate the
supreme law of the land with impunity.
Yet, Justice White did make a more compelling point. As he declared more generally: "To the extent that the Court denies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim the right to be made
whole and, therefore, denies him 'the protection of the laws.' "223 Thus,
even when the President acts lawfully, he "should [still] have the same
remedial obligations toward those whom he injures as any other federal
officer." 224 What Justice White challenged therefore, at least in part,
was the basis for a lingering concept of immunity in a democratic society that seeks to perpetuate not merely obedience to law but also "'the
219. See generally Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4806-15 (White, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 4815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 4811 (White, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 4806. For similar statements, see id. at 4806-07.
222. Nowhere did the majority make these kind of statements. Further, they were expressly or impliedly repudiated. See text accompanying notes 196-97, 199-200, 204-18.
223. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4811 (White, J., dissenting).
224. Id. There is also more historical evidence in support of such an expectation. See id.
at 4808-10. One might also have thought that cases like United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882), would have established that since the President cannot violate the law with "impunity" he might not be immune in cases where law has not been violated. Wilkes v. Dinsman,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849), a case not cited in Fitzgeraldbut one involving an action of
trespass against a military commander for assault and battery, seems equally important:
"IT]he chief agent of the government... is not to be shielded from responsibility if he acts
out of his authority or jurisdiction, or inflicts private injury either from malice, cruelty, or
any species of oppression, founded on considerations independent of public ends."
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And although such a challenge has been

partially set back by Fitzgerald,it will surely continue as long as a free
people cherishes the human right of each person to an "effective
226
remedy."

225. See also note 110 supra. Using the words of the Chief Justice in another opinion,
Justice White seemed to emphasize the policy justification for what he might term a better
"policy choice" concerning civil damages immunity: "'Accountability of each individual
for individual conduct lies at the core of all law-indeed, of all organized societies. The
trend to eliminate or modify sovereign immunity is not an unrelated development; we have
moved away from "the king can do no wrong." This principle of individual accountability
is fundamental. . . ."' Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4807 (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,429 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4811 & n.26.
226. See Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/8 10, at 137 (1948): "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution
or by law." On the general question of remedies, one should also recall the pronouncement
of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803): "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government
is to afford that protection. . .[Blackstone] says, 'it is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded."' For a similar point by the European Court of Human Rights, see
Golder v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Ser. A, vol. 18, paras. 34-35,reprinted
in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND

POLICY 563, 570-71 (1979). On the use of human rights law in constitutional litigation, see,
e.g., Paust, Book Review, supra note 95, at 229-44; Paust, Human Rights, supra note 32;
Symposium on Human Rights, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. no. 1 (1981).

